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NUMBER 7

HARVARD LAW REVIEW
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: A STUDY
OF LEGISLATIVE VETOES
Harold H. Bruff * and Ernest Gellhorn **
Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing
Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this
Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of
five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the
effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships
between the branches of government. Extrapolatingfrom this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process,
may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on
a record, and may encourage violation of the principle of separation
of powers, the doctrine of limited delegation of congressional authority, and emerging concepts of due process in administrative law.

VIOMPLAINTS of a malaise in the administrative process and
calls for regulatory reform are not new.' Recently, however, these attacks on government regulation have been renewed
with special fervor. Numerous cures have been proposed, ranging from general deregulation to sunset and sunshine bills.2 One
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A., Williams, 1965; J.D., Harvard, x968.
** Dean and Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A., Minnesota,

z956; LL.B.,

x962.

This Article is based on a report prepared for the Administrative Conference
of the United States. The Conference, however, has not approved the Article, and
the authors have sole responsibility for it.
' See generally Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies,
57 VA. L. Rav. 947 (1971). Even the term "malaise" has a pedigree. See H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 2-3 (1962).

2 Sunset laws would require periodic renewal of the authorization of agency
programs. They take their name from the fact that they would allow the "sun to
set" on particular programs unless their renewal is justified and authorized. See
generally Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REV.
511 (1976).
Sunshine laws provide for open administration by requiring that agency meetings be public and on the record. The recent federal sunshine law also forbids
ex parte communications in adjudicative proceedings. Government in the Sunshine
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4(a), go Stat. X241 (1976) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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idea receiving special attention in Congress has been a proposed
amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 3 providing that substantive rules issued pursuant to the notice-andcomment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553 must be submitted to
Congress for review before taking effect.4 Then, if either house

of Congress (or both houses, under some proposals) should disapprove a proposed rule within a specified period, such as sixty
days, it would not take effect. The purpose of this "legislative
veto," which would not require the concurrence of the President,
would be to give 'Congress an opportunity to void administrative
regulations which, in its judgment, exceed statutory authority or
implement unsound policy.5
In recent years, Congress has added legislative veto provisions to an increasing number of laws governing agency action."
Most of these statutes involve executive action other than rulemaking; they range in subject matter from the reorganization of
the executive branch to the conduct of foreign affairs and the administration of public works programs. No legislative vetoes have
§§ 55,-7o6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
'Such a bill reached the floor of the House at the close of the 94th Congress,
under a procedure requiring a suspension of the rules and a two-thirds vote to
pass it. The bill failed to receive the two-thirds vote by a narrow margin. H.R.
12o48, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. Hio666-9 o , H1o718-i9 (0976). See
generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1014, 9 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Congressional
Review of Administrative Rulemaking: Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231 Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., ist Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Review Hearings); Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal
Regulatory Agencies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
'These two objectives of a legislative veto may be difficult to separate in
practice. See, e.g., W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 45 (x967)
(congressional objections to the wisdom of agency policy are often phrased in
terms of its legality). See also p. 1419 infra.
Examples of recent regulations with little popularity in Congress include seatbelt interlock requirements ultimately reversed by legislation, see Motor Vehicles
and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of i974, Pub. L. No. 93-492, 88 Stat. 1470
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § I4Iob(b)(i) (Supp. V 1975)), and Environmental Protection Agency regulations that would have severely limited parking and automobile traffic in downtown Boston and Los Angeles, see Congressional Review
Hearings,supra note 4, at 41, 264, 426-30.
'These provisions take a wide variety of forms, including requirements for
congressional or committee approval of agency action. See generally Watson,
Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF,
3 5 U.S.C.

L. REv. 983

(1975); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCHx SERVICE, LIBRARY Or CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW, DEFERRAL AND DISAPPROVAL OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS: A
SUMMARY AND AN INVENTORY or STATUTORY AUTHORITY (1976); H.R. Doc. No.
416, 9 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. 753-819 (i974).
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been applied to adjudications, however, since they are constitutionally protected from direct congressional scrutiny.7
Since 1972, Congress has extended the legislative veto to a
series of agency programs involving rulemaking. Most of the
current federal experience with legislative veto of rulemaking
has occurred in five programs: 8 the Office of Education's establishment of family contribution schedules for its program of basic
grants for postsecondary education; the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's rules issued under the General Education Provisions Act since 1974; the Federal Energy Administration's exemptions from price and allocation controls on petroleum
products; the General Services Administration's regulations regarding public access to the papers and tapes of the Nixon Presidency; and all of the Federal Election Commission's rules governing the conduct and financing of campaigns. The proposals
currently before Congress would substitute a legislative veto
having broad applicability to rulemaking for this ad hoc approach.
This Article examines the history of these five programs in
order to appraise the desirability and the constitutionality of
applying the legislative veto to rulemaking. After providing
some background, we focus on the case histories and the lessons
to be learned from them. We then proceed to a necessarily more
speculative discussion of the long term institutional effects of
a broad legislative veto provision. Would it, for example, shift
the focus of rulemaking from the agencies to Congress? What
would be its effects on the agencies, on Congress, and on the courts
- and on the interrelationship of the three branches of government?
'See Pillsbury Co. r. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. I966).
The term "adjudication" as used herein means a full evidentiary hearing governed by §§ 5, 7 & 8 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1970 & Supp. V
1975).
Unless otherwise indicated, "rulemaking" means informal rulemaking
governed by § 4 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and not
formal rulemaking, a relatively rare procedure in which a statute explicitly subjects
rulemaking to the APA's adjudication procedures. The term "executive action" is
used for matters not within the APA's special procedural requirements for rulemaking or adjudication. These technical matters are further elaborated in
Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 39-41 &
nn.12-14 (,975).
1 Experience with the legislative veto is examined in detail in Part II infra.
See note 46 infra.
Legislative veto provisions are also found in some of the states and in the
British Commonwealth. See generally W. GELLHoRN & C. BYsE, ADINISTRATI
LAw 122-27 (6th ed. I974). We did not subject them to empirical inquiry, and
make only occasional reference to them here.
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I. THE BACKGROUND: CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND POLICY
ISSUES SURROUNDING THE LEGISLATIVE VETO OF RULEMAKING

Any proposal to impose broadly applicable limits on agency
authority to develop policy is intimately related to the long struggle of administrative agencies for legitimacy and independence.
American attitudes toward the agencies have always demonstrated
a fundamental ambivalence. On one hand, administrative agencies
are viewed as necessary vehicles for the development of policy
and are often created to resolve issues that Congress is unwilling
or unable to decide. They are expected to develop experience
and specialized knowledge and to provide efficient administration
of complex and burdensome tasks. On the other hand, Americans
are suspicious of delegation of lawmaking authority to agencies,
which seems inconsistent with the Constitution's allocation of the
responsibility for lawmaking to Congress. An assessment of the
legislative veto of administrative regulations requires an understanding of its place within the statutory and constitutional
scheme that has evolved to define the role of the agencies.
A. The Legislative Veto as a Substitute
for the Delegation Doctrine
Over the course of time, constitutional doctrine has developed
to support administrative lawmaking. The courts have come to
recognize that it is impractical for the legislature to make the
innumerable policy decisions necessary to the daily operation of
a large and complex government. Therefore, modern courts
applying the delegation doctrine, which theoretically limits congressional grants of power to the agencies, have rejected ancient
and rigid dicta that the lawmaking power vested in Congress may
not be delegated elsewhere.9 Today the courts purport to require
only that statutory delegations of congressional authority contain
basic policy standards for the administrator to follow. This
"standards" requirement is designed to preserve the separation of
powers by placing broad policy determinations in the hands of
elected representatives rather than appointed bureaucrats and
by facilitating judicial review. Yet even this minimal requirement has proved to be unworkable in practice. Almost without
exception, the courts have refused to enforce constitutional constraints on congressional delegations of lawmaking authority
'See, e.g., Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548 (1976); National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 4,5 U.S. 336,
341-42 (1974). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.O1-.03
(Supp. 1970); G. ROBINSON & E. GELtEORN, THE ADMImISTRATIVE PROCESS 102-06
('974).
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to the agencies. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to require
Congress to specify policy standards as clearly as possible, or to
revise broad standards as experience permits. The result is that
lawmaking power is now lodged in administrative hands without
any constitutional assurance that the agencies are responsive to
the people's will. 10
The legislative veto can be viewed as a mechanism to help
fill the void left by the decline of the delegation doctrine. Its
purpose is to limit agency rulemaking authority by lodging final
control in Congress. But instead of controlling agency policy in
advance by laying out a roadmap in the statute creating the
agency, Congress now proposes to control policy as it develops
in notice-and-comment rulemaking, after the agency's expert staff
and interested members of the public have had an opportunity
to assist in its formation. In this way Congress can be fully
informed before primary policy is decided. Still, the legislative
veto is only a negative check on policies proposed by the agencies,
not a means for making policy directly.
B. Separation of Powers
Legislative veto provisions raise a series of constitutional questions involving the separation of powers. Chief among these is
whether legislative vetoes constitute an impermissible evasion of
the President's veto authority, or an impermissible intrusion into
the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government (depending on whether the veto is meant for policy or
legality review)." Supporters of the legislative veto argue that
since it is a control on administrative lawmaking similar to that
which the delegation doctrine purports to impose, it is fully consistent with the separation of powers. They emphasize that the
branches of government are not wholly separated but often have
a limited role in one another's functions.' 2 For example, the President's veto gives him a role in legislation; the power of advice and
consent gives the Senate a role in administration. If, then, the legislative veto device gives Congress an appropriately limited role
0

Congress does, however, possess a variety of "oversight" devices. Agency

action is affected by legislative appropriations, congressional investigations, the
continuing supervision of the standing or special committees, and the operation
of the appointments process, including the power of advice and consent. In addition, Congressmen often play an "ombudsman" role by interceding with the
agencies on behalf of interested constituents. See generally W. GELLHORN & C.
BysE, supra note 8, at 109-22.
21See generally Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. .
LEGIS. 593 (X976), and sources cited therein at 593 n.i.
12 See, e.g., id. at 598-6oi. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i, 120-23
(1976) (per curiam opinion).
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in the executive function, it constitutes an appropriate counterweight to broad delegation. By returning policymaking authority
to Congress, it helps preserve the separation of powers. Opponents argue that legislative vetoes are functionally like legislation
in that they foreclose otherwise permissible readings of statutes.
To foreclose such interpretations similarly by legislation would require the approval of the President or the concurrence of twothirds of both houses of Congress to override his veto. Thus
legislative vetoes passed without presidential concurrence arguably abridge the President's role in the legislative process. 3 Furthermore, for Congress to pass on the legality of administrative
rules may usurp the judicial function. 4
If a single house may veto regulations, the fundamental
principle of bicameralism may be violated. The Constitution
lodges legislative authority in a bicameral Congress, in part as an
internal check against the aggrandizement of congressional power. 15 Proposals allowing one house to veto administrative regulations appear to circumvent that check.' Since the legislative
veto is designed as a negative constraint on policy-making, however, supporters argue that it gives each house no more power
than the bicameral system, under which legislation may also be
blocked by either house. They also emphasize that the statute
authorizing the legislative veto must itself be passed by the
normal legislative process involving concurrence of both houses
and presidential approval or veto override." Nevertheless, Congress cannot by legislation alter the bicameral system engraved
in the Constitution. Moreover, the substantive policy created by
the agency's rule, if within the bounds of the statutory delegation,
arguably had the approval of both houses and the President in
the original delegation. To the extent that a legislative veto by a
single house may redirect this policy, serious questions are raised
about the veto's consistency with the Constitution's legislative
scheme.
Whether the legislative veto will founder upon these constitutional objections is unclear. Although Mr. Justice White rejected
them in his concurrence in Buckley v. Valeo,' 8 a majority of the
Supreme Court specifically left the question for another day. 9
'3 See, e.g., Congressional Review Hearings,supra note 4, at 376-78.
4 See pp. 1429-31 inlra.
2
" TaE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315-i6 (J. Madison) (New American Library
196).
"See Watson, supranote 6, at 1032-36.
" See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 286 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
' 8 Id. at 284-86 (White, J., concurring).
9
See id. at 14o n.176 (per curiam opinion).

ed.
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The Court of Claims, however, recently has upheld the constitutionality of a one-house veto. °
C. The Legislative Veto in Context:
Developments in Rulemaking
The Administrative Procedure Act provides generally applicable procedural constraints for the agencies' delegated policymaking. It thus defines the procedural context in which an increased congressional involvement in rulemaking functions. The
basic assumption upon which the APA rests is that policy is developed and applied in one of two ways: by adjudication or by
rulemaking. 1' Most agencies have broad discretion to choose
which approach is more suitable. 2 However, this bipolar analysis reflects the formal structure more than the reality of the administrative process. Much agency action is neither adjudication nor rulemaking: the APA does not provide special procedures
for executive actions such as consent settlements, policy statements, and contracts. Nevertheless, the APA's constraints are
important. Adjudication must adhere to most of the common law
safeguards of a trial, including notice of the charges, a hearing before an unbiased tribunal, and an opportunity to present evidence
and to challenge or rebut contrary proof. The ultimate findings
and decision must be supported by the record. Informal rulemaking, in contrast, has traditionally required only published
notice of a proposed rule, an opportunity to comment on it, and
a concise statement of the basis and purpose of the final rule. 3
During the past several decades, the procedures of formal
adjudication have become increasingly elaborate and time-consuming. They have therefore seemed ill-suited to many new regulatory programs in such fields as environmental protection; Congress accordingly has set the agencies administering them on a
course of rulemaking. Whether spurred by Congress or on their
own initiative, agencies have relied increasingly on rulemaking or
other informal executive action rather than on adjudication. 4
Because the APA has few explicit -procedural requirements for
such activities and because no formal record is required, judicial
20
Atkins v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 256o (Ct. Cl. May 18, 1977). See
generally Clark v. Valeo, 45 U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1977) (en banc),
aff'd mer. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 45 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 6, 1977).
21 See note 7 supra.
22 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The governing

statutes of a few agencies, however, require rulemaking for the formulation of
policy. See Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 426, 478, 480.
21 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (I97o).
21 See generally Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits
of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (i974).
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review has been difficult.2 5 Courts have responded to this challenge by importing procedural requirements into various informal
proceedings on both constitutional and statutory grounds.20 Illustrative of this broader trend is a series of cases imposing new
procedural requirements for informal rulemaking.2 7 These judicial requirements have been summarized as follows:
First, both the essential factual data on which the rule is based
and the methodology used in reasoning from the data to the proposed standard must be disclosed for comment at the time a rule
is proposed . . . . Second, the agency's discussion of the basis
and purpose of its rule-generally contained in the "preambles" to the notices of proposed and final rulemaking and in the
accompanying technical support documents- must detail the
steps of the agency's reasoning and its factual basis. Third,
significant comments received during the public comment period
must be answered at the time of final promulgation ....
Fourth, only objections to the regulations which were raised with
some specificity during the public comment period, and to which
the agency thus had an opportunity to respond, may be raised
28
during judicial review.
Congress has also imposed special procedural requirements beyond those in the APA in several recent delegations of rulemaking power, in order to assure that agencies have fully considered
the issues and proposed solutions. For example, the Federal
Trade 'Commission's new rulemaking authority includes requirements for cross-examination and specific findings based on evidence in the record. 29
Several purposes are discernible in these new statutory and
judicial requirements. One is to assure fair treatment of persons
"2Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and
Other Federal Statutes, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 721, 754-55 (1975).
21 See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1976);

Pedersen, supra note 7, at 46-gO.

27 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 (D.C. Cir. March 25, 1977);
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2973);

International Harvester, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); General Tel.

Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 197); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2968). See generally Verkuil,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 6o VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
28

Pedersen, supra note 7, at 75-76 (footnotes omitted).

29 15

U.S.C. § 57a(b), (c) (Supp. V 1975). This provision of the Federal Trade

Commission Improvement Act granted express statutory authority to the FTC to
conduct rulemaking proceedings, but pursuant to stringent procedural requirements.
See also Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2970
& Supp. V 1975) (in particular, § 655 concerning rulemaking).
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submitting comments by requiring actual agency consideration
and response. A second is to foster reasoned agency decisionmaking by exposing thinking within the agency to public criticism
and by requiring reasoned resolution of the issues. A third is to
facilitate judicial review by providing a record to justify a final
rule.30 Obviously, these purposes are closely intertwined.
Introducing legislative veto provisions into this scheme raises
issues at the foundation of modern rulemaking. To what extent
is rulemaking a normative or political process which is brought
closer to the people's representatives by the legislative veto, and
to what extent is it an expert or rational process that should not
be subject to "political" influences? Recent commentators have
attacked the "naive" view of rulemaking which characterizes it
as a decision by experts divorced from political considerations.31
They emphasize that there is no ideal resolution of policy in
service of some unitary public interest; there are only resolutions of greater or lesser acceptability to experts and to the various
interest groups that make up the American public.32 Certainly
the notice-and-comment portion of the rulemaking process retains some "legislative" characteristics, in that anyone affected
by a proposed rule may make his views known, although tinged
by self-interest. Yet whatever the role of political conflict, the
premises of democracy demand that it be in the open. There is
ample justification for procedural constraints on rulemaking to
exclude unseen political influences.
The new statutory and judicial requirements thus seek to exclude secret influences and to assure the openness of the rulemaking process.- Their premises are that a meaningful statutory
standard, or at least rationality review by the courts, constrains
the substance of the resulting rules, and that the agency staffs
have a contribution to make in formulating rules even if they are
not Solomonic. Any statutory provision for a legislative veto
should be evaluated for consistency with these emerging aims of
the rulemaking process. Of particular importance to the courts
is that there be some sort of agency record for review and that
33
information in the record be the exclusive basis for decision.
When a legislative veto system is implemented, informal con10 All

of these themes can be found in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-

128o, slip op. at 49-51, 90-92 (D.C. Cir. March 25, 1977).
"' See generally Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75
COLUx. L. REV. 771, 778-79 & n.22 (I975); Noll, Breaking Out of the Regulatory
Dilemma -Alternatives to the Sterile Choice, 5I Ii -. L.J. 686, 689 (1976).
12E.g., Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27
STANr. L. REV. X041, io63 (1975) ; Noll, supra note 3, at 689.
"Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280, slip op. at 89-go & nn.118-i9
(D.C. Cir. March 25, 1977).
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tacts between the agency and the committees, staff personnel,
and members of Congress may increase. By their very nature
these contacts are likely to be secret, or at least undisclosed by
the administrative record. If the result is to deny interested
persons fair treatment, to deflect an agency from its statutory
grounds for decision, or to impair the ability of the courts to
review rules, a violation of due process or the governing statute
may result.34 A careful examination of the actual interactions
between Congress and the agencies that occur in the presence of
a legislative veto provision is therefore necessary to a judgment
of the desirability and constitutionality of the veto.
D. Policy Issues Surrounding Legislative Veto Provisions
So far, we have discussed only the theoretical consistency of
the legislative veto technique with the statutory and constitutional schemes governing the agencies. There seems to be no
clear a priori answer to the question of the constitutionality of
the veto or its consistency with the statutory scheme of administration. Therefore, any decision to apply it broadly to administrative rulemaking in general should rest partly on an informed
judgment regarding its likely effects in practice on the agencies,
the courts, and Congress. Before examining case studies of five
programs for which Congress has adopted the technique, we outline the policy issues surrounding legislative veto proposals."
The -purpose is to provide a frame of reference for analysis of
the case studies, and to aid evaluation of their usefulness in predicting the effects of a more general veto provision.
A question of central importance is whether the addition of
congressional review to administrative rulemaking will diminish
the effectiveness of the other procedural checks which Congress
and the courts have imposed on the rulemaking process. The
problem is that the congressional review process may not be
governed by rules as strict as those applicable to agency rulemaking. Present procedures might be replaced by a less visible
or closed process of review by congressional committee members
and staffs, as well as other interested Congressmen. And if interest groups can lobby Congress during the review period, their
influence might render currently required public procedures for
rulemaking ineffective. In any case, a veto statute may reduce
public participation before the agencies by shifting the focus of
"4See pp. 1433-37 infra.
" For an example of policy analysis of the effects of the legislative veto, see 2
SEN. Co

m. ON GOVERNZIENT OPERATIONS,

FEDERAL REGULATION, 115-22

FEDERAL REGULATION].

95TH CONG.,

IST SESS.,

STUDY

ON

(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as STUDY ON
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attention to congressional review procedures. This is not meant to
suggest that Congress need adopt the same procedures it imposes
upon the agencies, thereby producing a largely redundant review
process. It does suggest, however, that the differences between the
legislative and administrative process may make it difficult to
reconcile congressional review with other aspects of rulemaking.
An overall appraisal of a legislative veto provision must examine whether it helps to assure the acceptability of agency regulations to Congress as a whole. If review authority is actually
exercised by congressional committees, which are less broadly
representative than the full membership of either house, the intent of Congress as a whole may not be realized. The same may
be true if committee action is not visible to the other members,
so that there is no attention and assent to what the committees do.
Another fundamental issue is whether the opportunity for subsequent review of agency regulations will lessen pressure in
Congress for specificity in legislation delegating rulemaking power. A purpose of legislative vetoes is to allow Congress to postpone deciding policy questions until a concrete resolution appears
in the form of a proposed rule. Whether the effect of this approach is to increase or to decrease agency discretion will depend on the extent to which agency regulations receive actual
review.
Delay is said to be a serious problem in rulemaking; Congress and the courts have often responded by imposing deadlines
for promulgating rules.3 6 The legislative veto creates an additional
source of delay because rules must lie before Congress for the
statutory period whether or not there is serious consideration of
a veto. It is difficult to estimate the costs of delay in promulgating rules that lie before Congress without awakening actual review. Such costs seem likely to vary in their visibility and their
seriousness. And they would be without any corresponding
benefit unless the very presence of review authority improves
the drafting process by increasing agency attention to the acceptability of rules to Congress.
When review of a rule does occur, irreconcilable differences
in policy between the agency and Congress may lead to longterm impasses. As a result, the implementation of administrative
programs may be considerably delayed or entirely thwarted.
Thus, it is important to appraise whether active congressional
review will tend to produce the speedy resolution of policy. This
will depend on the time between rules submissions and vetoes,
and on the willingness of agencies to modify vetoed rules in accordance with the will of Congress. Agencies may respond to the
6

3

Id. at iz8.
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possibility of program interruption through legislative vetoes by
using adjudication rather than rulemaking to form policy. If
so, delay problems may be exacerbated by the increased use of
slow adjudicative processes.
In addition to increasing delay in the administrative process,
legislative veto authority may also increase Congress' already
considerable workload. Much of the work of screening regulations for review must be done by hired staff, rather than committee
members; consequently, already burdened staffs would have to
be enlarged to implement a generally applicable veto.3 7 Furthermore, especially where proposed rules deal with complex and
technical subjects, the review process itself may be difficult and
time-consuming for the members of Congress. Hearings must
be held and committee reports written. If a veto resolution is reported to the floor, there must be study, debate, and a vote.
Whether a significant number of rules would reach this stage remains to be seen, but there is the potential for an alarming increase
in the volume of Congress' business.
A final concern is that of the legislative veto's effect on judicial review. The failure of Congress to veto a rule might be construed as its ratification, and a court might feel bound to defer
to Congress' implied judgment that the rule is not ultra vires or
irrational." But congressional review may turn either on these
legality considerations or on a rule's soundness as a matter of
policy - and the nature of judicial review may depend on the
nature of congressional review. Courts may be more reluctant
to question the judgment of Congress where review is based on
considerations of policy than where it is purportedly limited to
questions of statutory intent, which are within the traditional
province of the courts. Moreover, the extent of a court's scrutiny
may depend on whether the rule received careful examination in
Congress, at least by a committee, or was not reviewed at all.
If the judiciary defers to agency rulemaking on a theory of implied ratification by Congress, there may result a net loosening of
constraints on agency discretion whenever rules have received
little direct examination in Congress.3" All of these legal questions would complicate the process of judicial review, and their
" It has been suggested, however, that in the past vetoes have been infrequent
enough to permit reliance by staff members on political controversy to bring a rule
to their attention. See id. at i21. The statement in text assumes that Congress
would attempt more systematic screening under a general veto.
3
Somewhat analogously, it has been argued that congressional reenactment
of the Internal Revenue Code constitutes ratification of existing Treasury Regulations. See K. DAvIs, AnxINSTRArIVE LAw TREATisE § 5.iO (1958).
c"See pp. 1426-28, 1431 infra.
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resolution might entail close judicial scrutiny of the internal
workings of Congress.

II. FivE CASE STUDIES
Theoretically, the legislative veto is a simple congressional
check on an agency's execution of its statutory mandate. The
term "veto" brings to mind a process as quick and easy as a
presidential veto - an action considered in isolation by a separate
branch of government and exercised independently. In practice,
the process by which legislative vetoes are exercised is neither
simple nor entirely independent; rather it is part of the complex
legal and political relationship between the agencies and Con40
gress.
Congress often includes veto provisions in legislation because
it mistrusts the agency's intentions or is displeased with the
agency's past decisions in a politically sensitive area.4 Another
reason for the veto is congressional indecision on major issues of
program implementation, and a consequent wish -to delegate
broadly while retaining a means of policing agency policy initiatives.4" These motives may coexist. 43 In any event, the advent
of the veto procedure changes the balance of power between Congress and the agency. The full legislative process, including approval by both houses and either approval by the President or
override of his veto, is no longer necessary to alter agency policy.
Still, the passage of an actual veto resolution may be nearly as
cumbersome and time-consuming for either house as legislation.
The usual process is for one or more committees or subcommittees
to hold hearings and to report to the full house, which debates
the matter before a final vote. 44 Thus, it is in the interest of both
Congress and the agency to avoid invoking the formal veto
process if informal accommodation can be reached.
Because of this mutual desire for accommodation, the potential for a veto engenders a process of negotiation and compromise
between Congress and the agency concerning the substance of
forthcoming rules. This has several effects. First, since congressional committees give veto resolutions initial consideration,
most of the activity occurs at the committee or subcommittee
4

"See generally 2 StUDY ON

FEDERAL REGULATION, supra

note 35 (overview

of agency-Congress relationship).
4 See pp. 1383, 1397-98, 1405 ifra.
42 The energy statutes, e.g., i5 U.S.C. §§ 751-760 (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C.

§§ 62oi-6422 (Supp. V X975), provide the best example of this.
4
See p. 1383 infra.
44 Time constraints can lead to omission of some of these steps. See p. 1395
infra.
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level.4 5 Second, to the extent that rules already formulated by
an agency are altered in negotiations with Congress, the agency's
consideration of public comment in drafting the rule may be displaced. Third, interests dissatisfied with the results of the
agency's notice-and-comment proceedings have a second opportunity to affect the rule by applying pressure in Congress. Finally,
the congressional review process and the consultations which it
engenders place great demands on the time and energy of both
the agency and Congress.
In this Part, we examine how the legislative veto has worked
in practice in five federal programs involving rulemaking, in
order to identify the veto's effects on the relationship between
Congress and the agencies and on the nature of the rulemaking
process. The studies cover a period from the inception of veto
authority in each program to the close of the Ninety-Fourth Congress in October 1976.46
A. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the
Basic EducationalOpportunity Grants Program
Among the agencies we studied, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) was the most successful in
running the gauntlet of the legislative veto. It was the only agency
to avoid suffering any actual vetoes, in part because it changed
its rules substantially under congressional pressure. The reasons
for HEW's success, and for the greater difficulties encountered
by the others, were partly political and partly inherent in the
nature of the programs involved.
HEW's Office of Education (OE) administers a wide variety
of federal programs of aid to education. Because of recent difficulties of state and local governments in supporting education, federal funds have been in great demand. Their distribution has
consequently been a sensitive political issue; Congress has maintained a lively interest in administration of the programs. But
legal controls have not always kept pace. Because the OE's
activities concern federal grants, its rules governing them fall
within an exception to the APA's procedural requirements for
" Congressional oversight of agency action also centers in the committees in
the absence of a veto provision, but there are some differences. See pp. 1386-87,
1389, 1422-23 infra.
46
The five programs were chosen because they had generated enough rulemaking experience for empirical investigation of the effects of the veto provision.
There are other legislative vetoes in statutes governing federal rulemaking, but
there had been no significant experience pursuant to them in May x976, when our
investigation commenced. E.g., Act of October 27, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-942, 88
Stat. 1470 (automobile passive restraints).
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rulemaking.17 Free from the constraints of the APA, the OE
caused congressional dissatisfaction by administering programs
of aid under unpublished rules or without any rules at all 8 Although the Department voluntarily adopted public rulemaking
procedures in 1971, 4 9 in the following year Congress attached a
legislative veto to the OE's new -program of Basic Educational
Opportunity Grants for postsecondary education.5 0 This first
application of veto authority to a federal program involving
rulemaking resulted not only from congressional mistrust of HEW
in its handling of aid to students, but also from substantial disagreement in the Conference Committee regarding how the program should be administered. 5

The basic grants program supports college students by paying
up to half of an undergraduate's educational costs, after sub-

traction of his family's expected contribution for the year. The
statute requires the Commissioner of Education to publish a

schedule of expected family contributions in the Federal Register
by a date well in advance of the academic year involved.

2

It

also requires an opportunity for public comment on the schedules,
and allows them to take effect on a specified date unless vetoed
sooner by either house of Congress.
During the first year of the new program, there were extensive
informal meetings on the content of the family contribution
schedules between the Office of Education and the staff of the
House and Senate committees having substantive responsibility
for the program. 3 The OE's policies seem eventually to have pre"'See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2) (1970).
48 Sky, Rulemaking and the Federal Grant Process in the United States Office
of Education, 62 VA. L. Rav. X017, 1041 (1976).
" See 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971).
50 20 U.S.C. § Io7oa(a) (3) (A) (ii) (Supp. V I975).
" Interview with Peter Voight, Director, Division of Basic Grants, Office of

Education, in Washington, D.C. (May 26, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Voight
interview). The conference report explaining the statute does not give reasons
for the presence of the veto provision. S. CONE. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d

Sess. 167

(1972).

The statute also contains controls on the OE other than the veto provision,
principally requirements that the agency review its rules and reissue them
after opportunity for public comment, see 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1970 & Supp. V
1975), and a provision for General Accounting Office evaluations and audits of
federal education programs, 20 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (Supp. V 1975). See generally
Sky, Rulemaking in the Office of Education, 26 AD. L. Rav. 129 (1974).
52 20 U.S.C. § 107oa(a) (3) (A) (i) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Oct.
12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 121(C), 9o Stat. 2091.
"2Interview with Christopher Cross, Senior Education Consultant for the
Minority, House Comm. on Education and Labor (then Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Legislation (Education), HEW), in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Cross interview]; Interview with Jean Frohlicher, Counsel for the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (then Deputy Associate Commis-
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vailed in most of these discussions. 4 Negotiation has since diminished, occurring mostly around the yearly hearings. The practice
of the House committee has been to introduce a pro forma resolution of disapproval each year in order to trigger the hearings and
an explicit decision on the schedules. 5 The Senate has also held
yearly hearings, but without introducing veto resolutions. Although there has been no formal consideration of the schedules
beyond the subcommittee level in either house, and no serious
attempt at a veto, the negotiations and hearings have allowed
searching review of the OE's regulations. Review of the schedules
has often been characterized by subcommittee members as limited
to questions of legality, but the actual emphasis has been on policy.
The schedules, though complicated, reflect specific normative
principles; the subcommittees have demonstrated keen understanding of the schedules and have displayed no diffidence in disagreeing with the OE on matters of substance. Congressional
review has focused on issues central to the equity of the grants.
There has been steady congressional pressure to increase the
number of persons eligible for the grants and the OE has changed
its family contribution schedules in response to this pressure
every year except 1976.56 Usually the pressure has worked to increase the amount of reserved assets which need not be included
in calculating a family's expected contribution. Pressed by constituents, the subcommittees have urged that certain assets, such
as a family's equity in its home or farm, should be excluded because they are not realistically available for educational expenses.
sioner for Legislation, OE), in Washington, D.C. (May 2i, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Frohlicher interview] ; Voight interview, supra note 5 .
4 Voight interview, supra note 51.
See Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 460; Hearings on H.R.
204 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 8, 123 (1973). In 1976, there were no hearings
on the schedules in either house because the Education Amendments of 1976
took precedence. OE received informal notice from the subcommittees that no
action to disapprove the schedules would occur. Letter from Christopher Cross,
Senior Education Consultant (Minority), House Committee on Education and
Labor, to H. Bruff (Nov. 2, 1976).
" See Hearings on Examination of the Family Contribution Schedule for the
Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program for Use in Academic Year z975-76
Before the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974); Hearings on H.R. 745 Before the Subcomm.
o,z Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 9 4th
Cong., ist Sess. (1975). In 1976, the pending Education Amendments precluded
close attention to the schedules. See note 55 supra. There were no changes in
them attributable to negotiations with the committees. Letter from Richard A.
Hastings, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation (Education), HEW, to H.

Bruff (Nov.

22,

1976).
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The subcommittees have not necessarily agreed with each
other, however. In one year, pressure to increase farm assets
reserves came from the Senate while pressure to increase home
equity reserves came from the House, creating a distinct possibility
of deadlock." The agency defused the controversy by raising
both reserves, which lowered grants for other applicants. In thus
moving the basic grants program in a substantive direction that
broadens the participation of large blocs of voters, the subcommittees have opened themselves to the charge of modifying the
original legislation to appease interest groups.
In the review process, time pressure has fostered compromise,
since everyone has known that if timely approval of the schedules
were not to occur, the entire program would be in jeopardy." The
agency has found a bargaining ploy in the cyclical fiscal year pattern. Each year it offers to meet the expressed concerns of the
subcommittees part way; a compromised issue can be dealt with
again the following year. These characteristics may have encouraged the subcommittees to avoid reporting out veto resolutions in order to preserve their negotiating stance with the agency.
Another consequence may be to -give the OE more control over
its destiny than would otherwise seem apparent, by allowing it to
forestall cohesive opposition to the schedules. Overall, the OE
and the subcommittees have increasingly approached agreement
on basic policy. Indeed, recent hearings in the Senate show
signs that the OE may have formed an alliance with the subcommittee, which may now stand in defense of policy accommodations reached between the agency and the subcommittee against
criticism generated by the public.59
B. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the
GeneralEducation ProvisionsAct
i. General Rulemaking.- In 1974, Congress amended the
OE's organic statute, the General Education Provisions Act
(GEPA), 6° to provide legislative veto authority over most OE
rules (other than the family contribution schedules), and to some
" See Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 445; Interview with
Richard A. Hastings, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation (Education),
HEW,
5 8 in Washington, D.C. (May 20, ,976).
Voight interview, supra note 5i.
29 Hearings on Examination of the Family Contribution Schedule for the Basic
Educational Opportunity Grant Programfor Use in Academic Year z976-77 Before
the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
9 4th Cong., ist Sess. 20, 27 (1975).
60 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1233 (1970).
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rules authorized by related statutes." Affected rules were to be
transmitted to Congress and would take effect forty-five days later
unless disapproved by concurrent resolution for inconsistency with
statutory authority.0 2 The veto's purpose, according to the House
report, was to arrest the agency's accumulation of quasi-legislative power and a corresponding attrition in Congress' ability to
make law. 3 The veto was limited to ultra vires rules, and a detailed finding of illegality was expected to accompany a veto
resolution. 4
Negotiations similar to those at the inception of the basic
grants program followed the adoption of the 1974 amendments
to the GEPA. Though reluctant to engage in negotiations, 5
HEW was brought into an "exhaustive" series of about twenty
meetings with congressional staff from both houses, in order to
insure that the staff's views would be considered in drafting
regulations. 6 Such negotiations were not confined, however, to
programs subject to a legislative veto. Extensive meetings between congressional and departmental staff had occurred after enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,67 which does not contain a veto provision. In all these instances, negotiations arose to
meet the need for extensive sets of new regulations in the face of
congressional dissatisfaction with past performance; 8 they suc61See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(i)

(Supp. V 1975).

This veto power applies to

activities under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1221d, 1221e, 1221e-i (Supp. V 1975), and under
title IX of the Education Amendments of 2972, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(f) (Supp. V
The 1974 amendments also subject the OE's rules to the notice-andcomment provisions of the APA. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(b) (2) (A) (Supp. V X975).
62 The disapproval period runs without interruption except when either house
adjourns for more than four days, whereupon a complicated set of provisions
determines the applicable period. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(2) (Supp. V 2975).
After a veto, the agency must respond to Congress' veto findings in proposing
any further rules. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(e) (Supp. IV X974).
63 H.R. RPp. No. 8o5, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (974).
64 A later amendment added a directive to the courts not to construe a failure
1975).

of Congress to adopt a concurrent resolution as approval of a rule, a finding of
statutory consistency, or an action raising a presumption of validity. Act of
Nov. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 7(a)(z), 89 Stat. 796 (amending 20 U.S.C.
§ 2232(d) (i) (Supp. V i975)).
65 Interview with Stephen Kurzman, Assistant Secretary for Legislation, HEW,
in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 2976) thereinafter cited as Kurzman interview];
Cross interview, supra note 53.
66 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 445.
67 Interview with Darrel J. Grinstead, Office of General Counsel, HEW, in
Washington, D.C. (May 20, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Grinstead interview);
Kurzman interview, supra note 65; Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4,
at 446, 454. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is codified at scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. (Supp. V 2975).
6" Grinstead interview, supra note 67.
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ceeded in reducing interbranch confrontation and the underlying
dissatisfaction.69
More recently, consultations between HEW and Congress
have been institutionalized. The Department has adopted a form
to identify proposed rules whose content may be politically sensitive, which serves to warn the Department's Executive Secretariat
that the subcommittees should be contacted and their views ascertained.7 0 This procedure has been used whether or not the proposed rule is subject to a veto provision and has occurred even before a notice of proposed rulemaking.71 Guidance on the political
acceptability of a rule can thus be sought in the absence of defini72
tive statutory guidelines.

The review process under the 1974 amendments has in large
part operated outside the formal and open procedures that were
presumably intended for it. 78 Although the 1974 amendments
authorized review of many HEW rules, only the controversial
title IX sex discrimination regulation, discussed below, has occasioned formal veto resolutions and hearings. For the other
rules, the review process has consisted of negotiations between
the agency and the members and staff of congressional subcommittees. There are several reasons for the willingness of Congress to compromise here. First, the statute provides that review
extends only to questions of legality, and is therefore limited. Second, the presence of the constitutional question has encouraged the
committees to avoid confrontation in favor of negotiation.74 Third,
the requirement for a concurrent resolution means that if either
house is satisfied with HEW's position, the agency prevails.
The principal practical problem for the agency caused by the
presence of the veto provision has been time. In the OE's programs of aid to education, the span of a fiscal year must include
both rulemaking to govern grants and the grant award process
6' Frohlicher interview, supra note 53; Cross interview, supra note 53.
70 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 446; Kurzman interview,

supra note 65.
71 Kurzman interview, supra note 65. Congress has also offered its views to
the agency during the public comment period, and has done so even for rules
subject to a later transmittal for possible veto. Id.; Interview with A. Neal
Shedd, Chief, Regulations Staff, Office of Education, HEW, in Washington, D.C.
(May 24, 1976).
72Agency personnel emphasize the absence of statutory guidance. E.g., Con-

gressionalReview Hearings, supra note 4, at 443, 446-47, 451.
71 id. at 448, 454.
74 Frohicher interview, supra note 53. The bill's signing statement expressed
doubts regarding the veto's constitutionality, Sky, supra note 48, at 1024 n.22,
and HEW's transmittal letters have reminded Congress of the issue. Hearings on
H. Con. Res. 330 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 94 th Cong., ist Sess. 24-25, 36, 39 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Title IX Hearings].
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itself, since the awards must be made within the fiscal year of
appropriation to avoid a lapse of funding." Thus, all the phases
of rulemaking (drafting a proposed rule, public participation,
drafting a final rule, and congressional review) and all the phases
of the grant process (invitation of applications, processing, and
award) must be completed within a year or less.7 To save time,
the OE began submitting proposed rules to Congress, so that the
periods for congressional review and public comment would run
concurrently. 77 'Congress forbade the practice by amending the
GEPA to require submission of final rules.7 8 In a renewed attempt
to expedite its processes, the OE has since invited grant applications against proposed rules, 7 9 with the understanding that the
applications may require revision if the rules are changed in
response to public comment. Any changes in the rules thus
create a considerable administrative burden and may defeat the
expectations of grant applicants. The end result of this streamlining process is a substantial administrative bias against changing rules in response to public comment.80
2. Title IX.The only HEW regulation to cause the introduction of resolutions of disapproval under the GEPA was the
one implementing title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972,"' which prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance. Title IX was adopted
in conference, without hearings or a committee report to guide
" See generally Sky, supra note 48. The OE does not find it wise to initiate
the rulemaking process until the experience of a prior year can be evaluated and
the appropriation for the current year is known. If appropriations are passed
after the start of a fiscal year, less than a year may be available for the process
of making rules and awarding grants. Time pressure has been further exacerbated
by the OE's practice of extending public comment periods beyond statutory
minima. See id. at 1032 n.34; Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at
456. Until the Education Amendments of 1976, the OE could waive public
participation in an emergency under the "good cause" provision of § 4(b) of
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (970). This option may now be foreclosed by the
Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 405(b) (x), go Stat. 2081
(0976).
76 Sky, supra note 48, at 1028, 1034,

2o36-37.

The OE is also subject to

statutory rulemaking deadlines, which have recently been tightened. Id. at 1022.
7 Id. at 1026. However, a "substantial" change in the final rule would occasion
resubmission to Congress. Title IX Hearings, supra note 74, at 33-34.
7'Act of Nov. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 7, 88 Stat. 796 (amending 2o
U.S.C. § 1232(d) (Supp. IV 1974)).
79 Sky, supra note 48, at 1029, 2033-34.

'o d. The practice of submitting proposed rules to Congress would have a
similar effect.
81 20 U.S.C. §§ x681-i682 (Supp. V 1975). For the final rule promulgated
under this title, see 4o Fed. Reg. 24127 (975).
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It left unresolved such major issues as

whether the ban on sex discrimination extended to interscholastic athletics." Nevertheless, the statute directed the federal
agencies administering aid to issue implementing regulations.
Within HEW, this task fell to the Office for Civil Rights.
Although legislative veto provisions were not made applicable
to regulations under title IX until two years later,8 4 the openendedness of the delegation and the controversial nature of the
subject matter made consultation with Congress desirable. The
agency therefore engaged in discussions with congressional staff
to aid development of a proposed rule.s5 Like the negotiations
following enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, these discussions confirm that interbranch negotiation is not always associated with a legislative veto.""
Because of the controversial nature of the subject, the agency
provided an extraordinary 12o days for public comment on the
proposed rule, and the response was enthusiastic. s7 A lively debate in Congress and among the public ensued. While public
comment was being received and considered, agency personnel
met with members and staff of committees of both houses of
Congress, and the Secretary met with Congressmen.' The Department requested suggestions and, in response to them, made
certain changes in the rule which were desired by Senator Bayh
and some women's organizations.8 9 Among these changes was a
requirement that institutions receiving grants conduct self-evalu82 S. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1972). See generally 28
CONG. Q. ALmANAC 385-98 (1972); 121 CONG. REc. S12006 (1975) (Sen. Helms);
Comment, HEWs Regulation Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
z972: Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 113, 142-45 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Ultra Vires Challenges]; Buck & Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to
a Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 6 CONN. L. REV. I (1973).

s1 Title IX Hearings, supra note 74, at ig; Buck & Orleans, supra note 82, at 12.
84 See pp. 1385-86 & note 6i supra.
85 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 446; Interview with

Gwendolyn Gregory, Director, Office of Policy Communications, Office for Civil
Rights, HEW, in Washington, D.C. (May 27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Gregory
interview].
8" Of course, there was precedent for negotiation by this time in the administration of the OE's basic grants program, which did have a veto provision.
87 See 39 Fed. Reg. 22227 (i974). The proposed rule took two years to develop. The agency received over 9,700 comments, 40 Fed. Reg. 24127, 24128
(1975), and attempted to respond to them in the final rule, Title IX Hearings,
supra note 74, at 31. For example, the proposed rules lacked self-evaluation
requirements, but many comments sought them, and the final rule included them.
Id. at 39.
8" Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 446; Gregory interview,
supra note 85.
" Gregory interview, supra note 85.
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ations in the elimination of discrimination. One can only speculate whether the women's groups would have achieved the same
changes without resorting to congressional pressure.9 0
After the final rule had been adopted by the agency, several
resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress."' The
only one to reach a hearing would have disapproved the very requirements for self-evaluation desired by the women's groups. 2
Its fate is illustrative of the constraints which time limits and
interest groups can place upon the veto process. The resolution
was referred first to committee and then to a subcommittee,
which held six days of hearings focusing mainly on a proposed
bill on a different topic.9

3

The subcommittee amended the resolu-

tion to add another minor element of disapproval and reported it
to the full committee, which, under pressure from the women's
organizations, referred it to the Equal Opportunities Subcommittee. 4 As the end of the period for disapproval approached,
this subcommittee held a one-day hearing and recommended
against passage of the resolution.95 Nothing further happened,
and the regulation took effect at the end of the statutory period
for disapproval.
C. The Federal Energy Administration
In contrast to HEW's experience under legislative veto provisions, which illustrates successful negotiation and compromise
with Congress, the early history of the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) shows the veto's potential for interbranch deadlock. It demonstrates how, in cases of disagreement on basic policy between Congress and the agency, the veto power can cause
the frustration of important agency programs or the failure to
formulate any programs at all. For the duration of the impasse
the agency is impotent, sharing with Congress the political responsibility for failure to resolve important national policy issues.
After the sales embargo by the oil-producing nations in 1973,
90 Because many public comments bad sought the same provisions, see note
87 supra, it is difficult to determine whether they were the result of public com-

ment or congressional pressure or both.

"' These are described in Ultra Vires Challenges, supra note 82, at 146 n.64.

"2See H. Con. Res. 330, 94 th Cong., ist Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H6415 (I975);
Title IX Hearings, supranote 74, at i.
" Review of Regulations to Implement Title IX of Public Law 92-3Z8 Conducted Pursuant to Sec. 43z of the General Education Provisions Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 94 th Cong., ist Sess. (3975); Title IX Hearings, supra
note 74, at 9.
14

See 33 CONG. Q. E484 (,975).

11 See id. at 1563 (1975). See generally Title IX Hearings,supra note 74.
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Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973 (EPAA) 91 to give the President power to allocate and fix
the prices of certain petroleum products.9 7 The Act also empowered the President to exempt any product from his controls
upon specified findings,9 8 but subject to legislative veto by either
house of Congress until each house had been in session for five
days.99 In the following year, Congress created the FEA as an
"independent agency in the Executive Branch" 100 to exercise the
President's powers under the EPAA. 01 The statute applied the
APA's rulemaking provisions to the FEA, with some modifications. 02
Although the FEA began to develop proposals for decontrol
immediately, no such proposals were implemented for nearly two
years because of the inability of the agency and Congress to
agree on policy. In July 1974, the new agency published a proposal to decontrol residual fuel oil, a heavy oil used by utilities
and industry, especially in the Northeast. 0 3 But the proposal
was dropped after informal consultation between the Administrator and a group of northeastern Congressmen convinced the
agency that the proposed exemption would not survive review. 04
The matter then lay dormant while both President Nixon and
Administrator Sawhill left office.
In his first state of the Union message, incoming President
Ford proposed decontrol of the prices of all regulated petroleum
products,"0 5 but Congress was in no mood to concur. In an effort
to reach an accommodation with Congress, the FEA in 1975 prepared three successive proposals for phased decontrol, with time
96

Pub. L. No. 93-I59, Stat.

627 (1973)

(codified at 15 U.S.C.

§§

751-76o

(Supp. V 1975)), repealed by Energy Policy and Conservation Act of x975, Pub.
L. No. 94-163, § 401(b)(i), 89 Stat. 871; see pp. 1392-94 infra.
"' See 15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1975).
08 See IS U.S.C. § 753(g) (2) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1975).

09 See id.
10o See 15 U.S.C. § 762 (Supp. V I975).
'' Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat.
97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-798 (Supp. V 1975)).
102 A minimum of ten days was required for public comment, but this requirement was waivable upon a detailed finding that delay would cause serious harm
to the public. For rules with significant impact, the statute required an opportunity for oral presentation of views, to occur no later than 45 days after the
rule's issuance. See 15 U.S.C. § 766(i) (I) (Supp. V 1975).
10339 Fed. Reg. 24669 (1974).
104 Interview with David Wilson, Office of General Counsel, Federal Energy
Administration, in Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilson
interview]; Interview with Eric Fygi, Office of General Counsel, Federal Energy
in Washington, D.C. (May 20, 1976).
Administration,
5

0 See

ii

WwEaY ComP. PREs. DoCs. 49

(1975)"
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spans of 24, 30, and 39 months. 0 6 The first was withdrawn when
it became clear that -Congress would not accept it. 0 7 The latter
two were vetoed by the House, 0 8 even though the 39-month plan
sought political acceptability by providing for small price increases before the 1976 elections, and much steeper increases
afterwards. The agency would go no further; it made no more
submissions prior to December of 1975, when the enactment of
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) 109

settled the issue by legislation.
There were several reasons for the agency's failure to reach
a successful compromise with Congress during this period. Most
important, it became clear that a Congress beset by fears of inflation was not yet ready for decontrol; in fact, it appeared to the
agency that the congressional position hardened as the FEA gave
way. 0° Moreover, Congress was in the process of attempting to
develop a coherent national energy policy for the first time. Accordingly, the agency's efforts occurred during a period of massive
political maneuvers in Congress. It is thus not surprising that the
agency was unable to gauge the mood of Congress accurately.
Despite the agency's judgment that both of the later 1975 decontrol proposals had sufficient support in Congress to survive
review, both were vetoed."' These setbacks were also due in
part to the ability of congressional staff to provide rapid and independent evaluation of the decontrol proposals. The agency had
supported them with analysis based on computer models of the
economy but was met with alternative computer analyses de'0' See 40 Fed. Reg. 19219, 30030, 31741 (X975).
'07 Wilson interview, supra note io4; Interview with Gorman Smith, Assistant
Administrator, Regulatory Programs, Federal Energy Administration, in Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Smith interview].
' 0°The first veto is described at 40 Fed. Reg. 31741 (i975). The second is
H.R. Res. 641, 94th Cong., ist Sess., 121 CONG. REC. H7899-goo (daily ed. July
30, 1975); 4o Fed. Reg. 34161 (975).
The Senate briefly debated its own
resolution disapproving the proposed decontrols, but it was ultimately tabled.
S. Res. 145, 94 th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. S143I8 (daily ed. July 30,
1975); 121 CONG. REC. SI4473 (daily ed. July 31, 1975).
10 Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (I975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 62016422 (Supp. V 1975)). One technical decontrol proposal, concerning "stripper
wells," did pass under the EPAA. Prices of oil from such wells, which produce
less than ten barrels per day, had not been controlled. To create an incentive
for greater production, the proposal allowed a well that had obtained stripper
status to retain it even if it produced more oil. See 4o Fed. Reg. 20295, 22223
(1975). Though the proposal was preceded by consultation with congressional
staff from both houses, Smith interview, supra note X07, the consultation produced no changes, as the proposal was not controversial. No congressional action
was taken.
110 Smith interview, supranote 107; Wilson interview, supra note xo4.
"I Smith interview, supranote 107; Wilson interview, supra note 104.
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veloped by the committee staffs during the short review period."'
A revised legislative veto procedure was inaugurated by the
EPCA." 3 The procedure applied to certain FEA rules termed
"energy actions," among which were exemptions from price and
allocation regulations promulgated under the EPAA.1 4 The statute extended the period of review to fifteen days of continuous
congressional session "I but provided that energy actions could
take effect earlier if approved by resolution in both houses."'
There were also provisions to expedite disposition of a veto resolution 17 and limitations on judicial review of rules that had
survived in Congress." 8
After the passage of the EPCA, the FEA submitted as Energy
Action No. i "I a proposal to decontrol residual fuel oil, for which
it had unsuccessfully floated a trial balloon earlier. This time,
the FEA was well prepared. It developed extensive data on the
east coast market to show that further price control would be
counterproductive. 2 Administrator Zarb met with members of
Congress to press for approval,'' and the Action included some
specific provisions designed to win favor in the Northeast.'2 2 As
a result of these efforts, the proposal sailed through without con23
troversy.
112

Interview with Charles Curtis, Counsel, House Comm. on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (June 4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Curtis
interview].
...Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (Supp. V
1975)).
1 4
1
See x5 U.S.C. § 76oa(c) (Supp. V 1975). There was a separate provision
for review of energy conservation contingency plans and rationing contingency
plans, which required the approval of both houses of Congress. 42 U.S.C. § 6221
(Supp. V X975) ; 41 Fed. Reg. 219o8, 21918 (1976).
1
See 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (c) (i) (Supp. V '975).
8
" See 42 U.S.C. § 642 (c) (i), (2) (Supp. V 1975).
117
See 42 U.S.C. § 6421(f) ( 3 ), (4) (Supp. V 1975).
"'8These provided that a court reviewing an energy action could not invalidate it on the ground that the findings were not adequate to meet the requirements of the energy statutes, or were arbitrary or without sufficient factual
foundation within the meaning of the APA. See I5 U.S.C. § 757 (h) (Supp. V
2975) (referring to 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2) (A), (E), (F) (i97o)).
The EPCA applied APA rulemaking provisions to most rules adopted pursuant
to it, with modifications similar to those in the EPAA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6393
(Supp. V 1975); p. 1391 & note 102 supra.
ilo 41 Fed. Reg. 7122 (1976).
2
oSee id. at 7124-33.
121 Interview with William J. Van Ness, Chief Counsel, Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Van Ness interview].
122 Wilson interview, supra note io4.
12
3See 41 Fed. Reg. 13898
(1976); Smith interview, supra note 07; Van
Ness interview, supra note X21; Wilson interview, supra note 104.
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In lengthening the period for congressional review from five
to fifteen days under the EPCA, Congress had tried to give itself
more time to consider energy actions in depth. Still, it had wanted
disapproval to come from its members' own reactions to executive action, and not from external pressures.124 Thus, the review
period had purposely been kept short to shelter Congress from a
concerted lobbying effort.'25 And since the normal committee report process can seldom be completed in less than fifteen days, the
brevity of the review period had the additional effect of reducing
the role of committee guidance. It thus made a veto unlikely
unless an action was clearly inconsistent with the majority will of
a house. The history oi Energy Action No. 2 126 show how these
effects can prove decisive in technical areas of law in which congressional staff cannot match the agency's ability to gather and
analyze relevant data.
To achieve competitive equity under its allocation and price
controls, Congress created a system of "entitlements," or transfer
payments among refiners. In an effort to equalize the costs of
oil acquired by refiners, Congress required those refiners who used
more than the national average of cheap "old" oil to make payments to those who used more than the national average of the
more expensive "new" or imported oil. Through an amendment
to the EPCA, 12 7 certain small refiners secured a partial exemption
from these payments, and with it a windfall for those with significant stocks of old oil. Another amendment was added, however,
authorizing a rule to remove the entitlement exemption upon
a finding that it resulted in an unfair economic or competitive
advantage for some small refiners over the others .1 8 Energy
Action No. 2 was promulgated to implement the second amendment. In order to generate lobbying support from those small
refiners who would be deprived of their windfall, the Action contained, in addition to the revocation of exemptions, provisions for
doubling the "small refiner bias," a price advantage applicable
to all small refiners. 29
Energy Action No. 2 was a highly technical regulation, and
the FEA experienced some difficulty in educating Congress regarding it. In a briefing paper prepared for Congress, 130 the
agency was able to demonstrate sharp differences in crude oil
124 Curtis interview, supra note i12.

125 Id.
Fed. Reg. 9391, 20392 (976).
127 See 15 U.S.C. § 753(e) (Supp. V 1975).
12641

128 See 15 U.S.C. § 76oa(g) (Supp. V 1975).
129 Smith interview, supra note 17o; Wilson interview, supra note 1o4.
13 Federal Energy Administration, Briefing Paper on the Increase in Small
Refiner Bias and Revocation of Current Small Refiner Exemption (May 21, 1976).
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costs to small refiners in the absence of entitlements payments,
but it could not translate these into differences in prices charged
for refined oil.'
Although congressional staff felt the proposal
needed the support of explanatory data on the profitability of
small refiners,' 32 the subject was not one on which the staff could
perform an independent analysis.' There had been little advance
warning that the proposal was forthcoming,3 3 and some staff
members believed that the FEA had intentionally surprised Congress with Energy Action No. 2 so that the period for review would
35
run before a careful evaluation could be made.
Whether or not such surprise was intended, Congress' inability
to make a thorough analysis, coupled with the increase in lobbying support generated by the provision for doubling the small refiner bias, led to the Action's survival despite substantial congressional doubt. Resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both
houses, 3 6 and hearings were quickly held. 3 7 But the time for
review dwindled and a motion to discharge the resolution from
committee became necessary in the Senate. 3 " As a consequence,
much of the debate over Energy Action No. 2 was procedural
rather than substantive. Some members took the position that,
in the absence of committee guidance, they would have to support the President's program.' 3 9 There were complaints about the
inadequacy of the FEA's data, and pressure was put on the FEA
to withdraw the Action so that Congress would have more time
to consider it.' 40 The FEA declined to withdraw it, and the veto
resolutions failed to pass in either house when the votes were
taken on the last day of the review period.'
This scenario was repeated in its broad outline when Congress
"' Smith interview, supra note IO7. The FEA argued that such a calculation
would entail immense labor and would be unreliable because of other variables
affecting prices.
132 Van Ness interview, supra note 121.
133 Curtis interview, supra note 112.
134 Id.; Van Ness interview, supra note i21.

"'Van Ness interview, supra note

IMI.

There was, however, substantial

lobbying by interested parties, including the FEA, during the review period. Id.;
Wilson interview, supra note IO4.
136 H.R. Res. X205, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H4633 (daily ed.
May 3o, 3976); S. Res. 449, 450, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S745o (daily
ed. May I9,1976).
"37 See 122 CONG. REC. S8163-64 (daily ed. May 27, 1976); Hearing on S. Res.
449 and 450 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 9 4 th Cong.,
2d Sess. (976).
' 3' See 42 U.S.C. § 64 21(f) (4) (Supp. V i975).
138See 122 CONG. Rac. H5o29 (daily ed. May 27, I976) (remarks of Rep.
Brown).
140 See id. at H5o3I (remarks of Rep. Staggers).
141 See id.
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considered Energy Actions Nos. 3 and 4,142 which proposed decontrol of the middle petroleum distillates, principally heating
and diesel oil. The FEA felt that its findings in favor of decontrol
were stronger for these products than they had been for residual
oil.' 43 The agency had doubts, however, that the proposals would
survive congressional review, since many voters feel the direct
effects of increased prices for the middle distillates. 4 4 Thus, the
anticipated problems of congressional review were primarily political. Veto resolutions were again introduced in both houses, and
the Senate committee reported its resolution favorably.' 45 Nevertheless, both resolutions again failed in votes taken on the last day
for review. 146 The histories of Energy Actions Nos. 2, 3, and 4
illustrate the difficulty of exercising the legislative veto power
when the period for review is short. The short review period does
not seem to have had its intended effect of sparing Congress from
lobbying by the FEA on the one hand and interests opposed to
the proposals on the other. In fact, by hampering the normal
committee report process, Congress may have deprived itself of
sufficient internal guidance on the very sort of technical subject
matter for which it usually relies heavily on committee expertise.
Thus, the members of Congress may have been left to exercise
their independent judgment when they felt least capable of doing
so. This may have resulted in an advantage for the contending
lobbies, perhaps especially for the "expert" FEA, 147 rather than
the intended disadvantage.
For its part, the FEA did not engage in the detailed negotiation over the substance of proposed rules that typified HEW's
practice, perhaps because of the diminished role of the committee
process. Instead, the FEA ordinarily tried to defuse political opposition in advance by the substance or timing of its proposals.
It then lobbied Congress from a relatively fixed position. 4 8 This
142 41 Fed. Reg. 22591 (1976). See also id. at
142 Smith interview, supra note 107.
14 4

17512,

24516.

Id.

145H.R. Res. 1302, 1303, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H5927 (daily

ed. June I5, 1976); S. Res. 469, 470, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S9 765
(daily ed. June 17, 1976); Hearing on S. Res. 469 and 470 Before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 9 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. Nos.
94-IOOO & 94-iooI, 9 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
146 122 CONG. REc. H7230 (daily ed. July 1, 1976) (continuing the proceedings
of June 30, 1976) ; 122 CONG. REc. SII2O2-O9, 52247 (daily ed. June 30, 2976).
147 Some of the congressional staff feel that the agency has such an advantage.
Van Ness interview, supra note 121.
141 Id.; Curtis interview, supra note 112.
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practice seems to reflect a view that Congress would not have the
time or the ability to understand and evaluate a proposal fully,
so that raw political power would likely carry the day.'49
D. The General Services Administration and the Disposition of
President Nixon's Papers and Tapes
A legislative veto provision gives Congress the power to disapprove an agency's rules, not to rewrite them. Within the confines of the veto procedure, Congress can only respond to the
agency's initiatives. Thus, irreconcilable disagreement between
the agency and Congress can result in a deadlock of considerable
duration. Moreover, the danger of deadlock is increased when
the agency in question is one within the executive branch and
the two branches have opposing political objectives with regard
to the agency's program. Such was the case in the efforts of the
General Services Administration (GSA) to provide by rule for
the disposition of President Nixon's controversial papers and tape
recordings.
In September 1974, a month after his resignation from the
Presidency, Mr. Nixon made an agreement with General Services
Administrator Sampson granting the government custody of the
papers and tapes but recognizing title in Mr. Nixon. 1 0 The
agreement provided that the tape recordings were to be destroyed
upon Mr. Nixon's death or in 1984, whichever occurred first.
Objecting to this agreement because it placed the materials in
imminent danger of destruction and overly restricted access of
the courts and public to them, 151 Congress speedily passed the
14.

The FEA's later adventures in the 94 th Congress deserve brief summary.

On July 30, 1976, the Federal Energy Administration Act expired. Act of June
30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-332, go Stat. 784. After a hiatus during which its
functions were performed by a federal energy office created by executive order,
Exec. Order No. 11,930, 41 Fed. Reg. 32399 (1976), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 11,933, 41 Fed. Reg. 36641 (1976), the FEA was reconstituted by the Energy
Conservation and Production Act of 1976. Act of August 14, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-385, go Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered sections of I5, 42 U.S.C.). The FEA's
decontrol program then continued with the exemption of naphtha jet fuel from
price controls in Energy Actions Nos. 6 and 7, which did not arouse substantial
congressional displeasure. 41 Fed. Reg. 40451; 122 CONG. REC. SI6o78 (Sept. 17,
,976). Energy Action No. 5, the exemption of specialty products such as lubricants,
had previously passed without controversy. 41 Fed. Reg. 34785 (1976). The
final major step, the decontrol of gasoline, was left for after the 1976 elections.
See 41 Fed. Reg. 51832 (1976) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
'"The
Nixon-Sampson agreement, X20 CONG. REc. S18326 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1974), resolved the legal issues in accordance with Attorney General Saxbe's
opinion of the day before, 43 Op. Air'Y GEN. 1 (I974).
151 S. REP. No. 93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-1507,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (I974). See generally Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430, 439
n.8i (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Presidential Recordings1 52 and Materials Preservation Act to protect and control them.
Title I of the Act directed the Administrator of General Services to take possession of Mr. Nixon's presidential papers and
tape recordings and to submit a report to Congress within ninety
days, proposing and explaining regulations to provide public access to them. These regulations, which could be disapproved by a
resolution of either house within ninety legislative days, were
to meet a series of explicit purposes: to provide the public with
the full truth about the Watergate scandal at "the earliest reasonable date," to make the materials available to the courts for fair
trials, to provide public access to materials of general historical
interest unrelated to Watergate, to protect privileged material and
information affecting national security, and to return personal
materials to Mr. Nixon. Despite this explicit enumeration of
statutory objectives, and despite repeated and intensive negotiations with committees of both houses, GSA has not yet promulgated a set of regulations that has survived congressional review.
GSA has issued three sets of proposed rules; Congress has vetoed
all three.
While formulating the first set of rules, GSA consulted closely
with the staffs of a Senate committee and a House subcommittee. 53 In a series of twelve to fifteen meetings with the Senate
staff, GSA presented drafts of the regulations for comment and
criticism and then revised the drafts for presentation at the next
meeting.'5 Significant changes were also made on the early
drafts after long line-by-line sessions with House staff.1" These
1"2 Act of

Dec. i9,

1974, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695,

reprinted at 44

U.S.C. § 2107 note (Supp. V I975). The legislative history includes S. REP. No.
93-1181, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (I974); S. REP. No. 93-x182, 9 3d Cong., 2d Sess,
(1974); Hearings on the "Public Documents Act" Before the Subcomm. on Printing of the House Administration Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). After consideration by a conference committee, both Houses enacted the legislation on
December 9, 1974. 120 CONG. REC. Hix445, S2o8o9 (daily ed. Dec. 9, I974).
For a chronology of the legislative history, see Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430,
44o (D.C. Cir. 1975).
1 3 Interview with Donald P. Young, General Counsel, GSA, and Steven
Garfinkel, Chief Counsel, Records and Archives, GSA, in Washington, D.C. (May
27, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Young-Garfinkel interview].
"4 Interview with Eli E. Nobleman, Counsel, Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, in Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Nobleman inter-

view].
15 Interview with Edward J. Davey, Jr., Counsel, Subcomm. on Printing,
House Administration Comm., in Washington, D.C. (June 1, 5976) [hereinafter
cited as Davey interview]; Interview with William E. Sudow, Former Special
Assistant to Rep. Brademas, Office of the Majority Whip, and Counsel, Subcomm.
on Printing, House Administration Comm., in Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Sudow interview].
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negotiations reduced the number of unresolved issues to five or
six by the time the regulations formally reached Congress.' 56
There was no public participation in the rulemaking because the
statute did not require it.'5 7 And GSA would not have entered
negotiations with the committees in the absence of a veto provision. 5 8 Thus, as with HEW, the existence of a legislative veto
gave rise to close consultation between the agency and Congress
to determine the substance of regulations.
The first set of proposed regulations appeared on March i9,
1975, the last day permitted by the statute.'5 9 In the Senate
hearings that followed, the function of congressional review was
said to be to determine whether the rules conformed to their
statutory purpose. 6 0 The agency argued for restrictions on public access to avoid deterring future Presidents from keeping
records. 6' It further argued that the critical decisions on public
disclosure should be made by the Administrator, a political appointee, and that the statutory responsibility to make such decisions could not legally be delegated to anyone else.' 6s Memoranda on these and other legal issues were exchanged by a Senator, the Administrator, and interested scholars. 63
In the end, the Senate committee decided that the regulations
were inconsistent with the purposes of the statute in eleven particulars and recommended passage of a veto resolution. 6 4 For each
of the eleven offending provisions, the committee report suggested
substitute language to guide later GSA submissions. The committee did not assert, however, congressional power to amend
GSA's rules without legislation. 5 It did assert the power to veto
particular items in a rule, leaving the rest to take effect, but
recommended complete disapproval here because the provisions in
question were integral to the regulations.
1"6 Sudow

interview, supra note 155.
Young-Garfinkel interview, supra note I53. In addition, the general question of public access to presidential materials was to be examined by a commission
created by title II of the statute, Public Documents Act §§ 201-203, 44 U.S.C. §§
3315-3324 (Supp. V 1975).
157

158 Young-Garfinkel interview, supra note 153.
150 4o Fed. Reg. 2670-71 (i975).

Hearings on the GSA Regulations Implementing the Presidential Records
and Materials Preservation Act Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (i975) [hereinafter cited as x975 Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations].
161 Id. at 7-8, 23-24.
162 Id. at 24-25, 76, 344-48, 371-78.
163 Id. at 70-72.
1a4 S. REP. No. 94-368, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 1 (,975).
165 1975 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, supra note
16o, at 70-72.
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While a similar veto resolution was being considered in a
House subcommittee,166 the Senate vetoed the first set of proposed rules, primarily because they allowed the Administrator
to override archivists' decisions on public access to the materials." 7 GSA thereupon revised its rules; a second set of proposed
regulations was submitted to Congress on October i5, 1975, Ad-

ministrator Sampson's last day in office. Under the revised rules,
the Administrator was to be only one member of an access review
board, the decision of which was to be final. Though Senate committee staff initially objected to the Administrator's presence on
the board, after negotiations they acceded to GSA's position. 0 8
Because the House staff ivould also have preferred removal of
the Administrator from the board, however, his role remained
open for negotiation. 6 9 This episode suggests the potential for
delay inherent in tripartite negotiation between an agency and
the two houses of Congress.
In the case of the GSA regulations, however, the major obstacle to successful compromise was not the structure of the negotiations, but the political division between GSA and Congress.
As an agency within the executive branch, GSA was responsible to
a Republican President, while a Democratic majority controlled
Congress. Because of the presence of Administrator Sampson,
whose agreement with former President Nixon had prompted the
legislation, Congress had been suspicious of GSA throughout the
rulemaking proceedings. This suspicion grew to formidable proportions when GSA, ostensibly responding to doubts cast by a
judicial decision upholding the constitutionality of the Act, tried
to withdraw the second set of regulations before hearings in the
House could begin.
The decision in question was Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,'7 ° in which a three-judge court rejected a claim
166

Hearings on GSA Regulations to Implement Title I of the Presidential

Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Before the Subcomm. on Printing of
the House Comm. on Administration, 94 th Cong., ist Sess. (1975). These hearings
characterized review as directed to the legality of the rules. Id. at 29.
167 121 CONG. REc. S'5803-4>3 (daily ed. Sept. i1, 1975); Nobleman interview,

supra note 154; Sudow interview, supra note i55. The House committee shared
the Senate's concern over the role of the Administrator in public access decisions,
H.R. REP. No. 94-56o, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 4 (X975), and over GSA's ban on
reproduction of tapes (which was meant to avoid commercial exploitation). The
House Committee also had an interest not fully shared in the Senate regarding
the adequacy of notice to be given to persons mentioned in the tapes before public
access occurred. H.R. REP. No. 94-560, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 8-9 (,975) ; Davey
interview, supra note z55; Sudow interview, supranote I55.
16. Nobleman interview, supra note 154.
169 Davey interview, supra note I55.
704o8 F. Supp. 321

(D.D.C. 1976)

45 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Nov.

29, 1976)

(three-judge court), prob. juris. noted,

(No. 75-1605). The decision did not reach
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that the Act was unconstitutional on its face and refused to enjoin its enforcement. While the proposed regulations were not
in issue, the court discussed in dictum some constitutional constraints on them. First, the court noted that the regulations should
preserve the fundamental rights to privacy of Mr. Nixon and
others, stating, however, that the proposed rules would provide
"not insignificant" protection in this regard.'7 1 Second, it suggested that the provisions for referral of evidence of crime found
in the presidential materials would warrant reexamination in
light of the fourth amendment.172 Although the court did not enjoin enforcement of the Act as a whole, it did enjoin GSA from
processing or disposing of the materials pending appeal.
Reading the decision as throwing substantial constitutional
doubt on its proposed regulations, GSA concluded that it should
review them carefully. 7 3 Just prior to the scheduled House hearings, Administrator Eckerd attempted to withdraw the proposed
rules from further congressional consideration. 7 4 The congressional reaction was one of anger. This was partly due to the staff's
great investment of time in negotiations, which would be wasted
if the rules were changed significantly.Y It was also due to the
suspicion and mistrust of the agency's motives that had existed
from the outset. There was some feeling among the Senate staff
that GSA's chief objective was to delay implementation of the
statute to avoid disclosure of the details of the Watergate scandal
until after the 1976 presidential election. 1 76 To the staff of both
houses, the withdrawal attempt seemed unjustified and in bad
faith.Y The committees refused to recognize the withdrawal as
valid because the statute made no provision for it and because
delay would frustrate the statutory aim of providing the public
with the truth about Watergate as7 quickly as possible.' 7 The
ensuing House hearings were bitterY.

the issue of the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision. See 4o8 F. Supp.
at 338 n17.
" Id. at 335-37, 357-58 & n.52, 368 n.65.
1 2

" Id. at 366 & n.61.

1Y3Young-Garfinkel interview, supra note 153.

GSA had responsibility for
assisting the Department of Justice in defending Mr. Nixon's lawsuit and was
encouraged to reconsider its rules by the Department. Id.
174 Letter from Jack Eckerd to Nelson Rockefeller (Jan. 21, :976), printed in
S. REP. No. 94-748, 9 4 th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
175 Nobleman interview, supra note 154; Sudow interview, supra note 155.
178 Nobleman interview, supra note 154.
177 Id.; Sudow interview, supra note 155.
178 Letter from Abraham Ribicoff, John Brademas, and Charles Percy to Jack
Eckerd (Feb. 5, 1976), printed in S. REP. No. 94-748, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5
(1976). The withdrawal could produce actual delay in access, of course, only after
removal of the court orders preventing GSA from processing the materials.
170 Sudow interview, supra note 155.
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In its report on the second set of proposed regulations, the
Senate committee argued that the withdrawal was not effective
and that the regulations would take effect unless disapproved. 180
The committee report said that the second set of regulations had
resolved most of the problems found in the first set.18' Nevertheless, the committee and GSA had failed to resolve problems involving the composition of the review board, the adequacy of
notice to affected individuals prior to public access, the ban on
reproduction of tapes, and certain other provisions. 8 2 As a result, the committee recommended passage of the veto resolution.
On April 8, 1976, the Senate vetoed the second set of proposed
regulations in seven particulars.'83
Following this veto, GSA submitted what it regarded as a
new, third set of proposed rules. Although the agency had made
some concessions on principal issues, these were well short of
surrender. Two meetings prior to submission of the rules between
the Administrator and Representative Brademas and his staff
had produced no changes.8 4 On September 14, the House vetoed
the third set of rules in six of the seven particulars which the
Senate had vetoed in April.' 5 After this third veto of its public
access regulations, GSA awaited the convening of the NinetyFifth Congress for further submissions.
There are several important lessons to be learned from this
brief history. First, despite numerous and intense negotiations,
a legislative veto may only lead to deadlock and inaction where
there are substantial political differences between Congress and
the rulemaking agency. In such a case, the delegation of power
to the agency becomes an excuse for inaction in Congress, probably making it more difficult for Congress to pass further legislation implementing its views. Thus a recalcitrant agency, by
refusing to modify its rules to accord with the desire of Congress,

ISO S.REP. No. 94-748, 94 th Cong.,
81

1

Id.

2d Sess. 2 (1976).

18 2 Id. at 5.
183 S. Res. 428, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S52 9 0-91 (daily ed.
April 8, 1976).
'4Davey interview, supra note 155; Sudow interview, supra note 155;
Young-Garfinkel interview, supra note 153.
185 H.R. Res. 1505, 122 CONG. REc. H1o43-44 (Sept. 14, 1976). The report
of the Committee on House Administration took the position that except for the
vetoed items, GSA's rules had already taken effect. H. R. REP. No. 94-,485, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Since the rules could not be implemented without the
vetoed provisions and since court orders had stayed implementation, the issue of
the legality of their "withdrawal" became largely academic. In other circumstances, however, the attempt to use an "item veto" could leave the legal status
of rules in the greatest doubt.
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or by refusing to submit new rules after a veto, may bring the
process of government to a halt and render the initial delegation
ineffectual.
Second, judicial and legislative review of regulations may
interact in complex ways. In Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, the court remarked on the Administrator's "dilemma"
should Congress veto rules he thought necessary to provide adequate constitutional protection.' 86 This dilemma suggests the
possibility that the courts, in applying the strictures of the Constitution, will create a deadlock which the agency is powerless
to break. Similar specters of impasse and legal confusion are
raised by the controversy over the effectiveness of GSA's87 attempt
to withdraw its rules from congressional consideration.
Third, GSA's experience with Congress suggests the potential
for mischief in the use of an item veto, which could nullify parts
of a regulation, leaving the rest to take effect. Functionally, such
a result is difficult to distinguish from the disclaimed power to rewrite agency rules without legislation. Further, it could have the
practical disadvantage of leaving rules to be administered by an
agency not in sympathy with their altered substance.8 More
important, the assertion of item veto power has a constitutional
dimension. In most applications an item veto is a lesser intrusion
into the administrative function than affirmative congressional
amendment of rules without legislation. At the same time, the
item veto may represent a more substantial intrusion into the
administrative function than does the entire veto of a rule, because it interferes with the particular resolution of policy made by
the agency." 9 Thus, if the legislative veto of an entire rule is
seen as the limit of congressional power to act without legislation,
the item veto may be unconstitutional.
E. The Federal Election Commission and
Reform of Campaign Expenditures
Interbranch political differences are not the only source of
delay and deadlock in the application of a legislative veto. The
ISO4o8
18'

F. Supp. at 338 n.7.

This issue, however, could easily be settled by explicit statutory provisions

permitting or prohibiting withdrawal.
"'8 To a certain extent, the same disadvantage exists when a court invalidates
sections of a rule on statutory or constitutional grounds. But an agency displeased
with judicial nullification of part of a rule may rescind the rule entirely, if it
prefers that option. Such a choice will not be freely available to an agency whose
rule is subject to an item veto by Congress, whenever any further amendment
(including rescission) is also subject to a veto.
1SOAlthough the veto of an entire rule may seem a greater use of congressional
power, it leaves the agency free to recast the rule as it chooses.
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same sort of impasse may occur when the agency is independent,
especially when the agency's mandate is to perform a politically
sensitive function.'
An agency's formal independence from
presidential control may, however, signal an increased dependence on Congress, and a lessened ability to resist congressional
demands.1 91 Especially when the function of the agency is to
regulate conduct of the members of Congress themselves, the legislative veto may be a means of keeping the real power in the hands
of Congress while creating the appearance of independent authority in the agency's hands. Congress may use the veto to determine
the content of agency policy - or to frustrate statutory purposes
entirely - while the political responsibility is lodged formally
with the agency. Indeed, this seems to have been Congress' course
of action with regard to the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
and the establishment of rules for expenditures in presidential
and congressional campaigns.
In response to the misuses of campaign contributions during
the Watergate era, Congress established the FEC in 1974 to
supervise and regulate the acquisition and use of campaign funds
by candidates for federal office.'" 2 The agency was to proceed
by requiring reports, investigating, bringing enforcement actions,
and making rules pursuant to APA procedures. 19 3 Both presi-

dential and congressional candidates were within the FEC's jurisdiction. Because of the breadth of its jurisdiction and the political sensitivity of its mission, the agency's authority was carefully
circumscribed by checks and balances. Originally, it was to have
been composed of two presidential appointees, two House appointees, and two Senate appointees, all to be confirmed by a
majority of both houses. This composition was struck down in
Buckley v. Valeo

104

as violative of the appointments clause of

the Constitution. 5 The greatest surviving check on the Commission's power was a legislative veto provision. Proposed rules
were to be transmitted to Congress with detailed explanation and
justification and could be disapproved at any time within thirty
190

Of course, neither independent agencies nor those within the executive

branch are divorced from politics. Theoretically, they differ in the greater freedom
of the independent agencies from presidential control, but the practical differences
in this regard can easily be overstated. See Robinson, supra note x, at 950-52.
191 See id. at 954-55.
12 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, x8, 26, 47 U.S.C.). The FEC
is established under 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (Supp. V 1975).
l"'For the rulemaking procedures, see 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3) (Supp. V z975).
194 424 U.S.' (1976).
9'U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See 424 U.S. at 140-41; The Supreme Court,
z975 Term, go HARv. L. REv. 56, 172 n.9 (1976).
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196

legislative days.
Rules dealing with congressional campaigns
could be disapproved only by the house affected, while those
dealing with presidential campaigns could be disapproved by

either house.
Although the inclusion of the legislative veto provisions was
motivated partly by generalized distrust of the agencies and
partly by a desire to insure the conformity of regulations to the

statute, those responsible for them also expressed concern about
possible control of Congress'by the FEC.'9 7 In fact, under the

veto provision, the control which some Congressmen had feared
did not materialize. Even though the FEC, by the time of the

Buckley decision, had produced a complete set of rules to implement the statute except for the criminal code provisions, 9" Congress demonstrated its ability to prevent proposed rules of which
it disapproved from becoming effective. For instance, the FEC
proposed that reports of contributions and expenditures be filed

initially with it, with copies to be forwarded later to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House.' 99 Members of

the House preferred that the reports be filed with Congress first,
so that they could be reviewed for errors and illegalities and

corrected by their authors. 200 After meetings between the FEC
and House members and staff failed to resolve the issue, 2° ' the

House vetoed the proposed rule on the ground that it conflicted
with the statute. 0 2 Although the FEC had felt that the statute
'O'See 2 U.S.C. § 438(c)(2)-(3) (Supp. V i975). The term legislative day
was defined as any day when both houses are in session. There were similar
congressional review provisions in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9o09, 9039 (Supp. V i975).
107 Sudow interview, supra note 155.
1 Interview with Dan Swillinger, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election
Commission, and Barry Shillitoe, Senior Staff Attorney, Office of the General
Counsel, Federal Election Commission, in Washington, D.C. (May 28, 1976)
(hereinafter cited as Swillinger-Shillitoe interview]. The Commission had extended the time for public comment on its proposed rules. 4o Fed. Reg. 28579
(1975); 121 CONG. REC. $ii888 (daily ed. July 7, 1975).
1994o Fed. Reg. 33169 (,975); 12
CONG. REC. H8185, SI4944

(daily ed.
Aug. i, 1975).
200
Interview with James F. Schoener, Minority Counsel, Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections, Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, in Washington,
D.C. (June 4, 1976); Sudow interview, supra note 155. For criticism of the rule
in the House, see 121 CONG. REc. HIoI96 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975) (remarks of
Rep. Hays); id. at Hioi88 (remarks of Rep. Brademas).
201 See Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1227, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1976)
("Stipulation as to Findings of Fact"), certification of questions dismissed, 45
U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1977) (en banc), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark
v. Kimmitt, 45 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 6, 1977).
202 H.R. Res. 780, 94th Cong., ist Sess., 121 CoN. REC. HIoI97-98 (daily ed.
Oct. 22, 1975). The Act provided that reports and statements "shall be received
by" the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate "as custodian for the
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provided clear authority for its rule, 20 3 it soon capitulated; a
revised rule requiring initial filing with Congress was submitted in
December 1975 204 and survived review.
The other salient example of Congress' use of the veto power
to protect its own political interests was its treatment of the rule
concerning office accounts. As originally proposed by the agency,
this rule provided that contributions received by an incumbent
federal officeholder to defray the costs of office would be considered subject to the statutory limitations on contributions and
expenditures. 23 The Senate committee which considered the rule
claimed to support its evident objective-that expenditures
which could influence elections but which might not be classifiable
as ordinary campaign spending be identified and limited. 0 0
Nevertheless, its report criticized the rule for treating incumbent
governors and other state officials, who were not subject to the
statute, differently from incumbent Senators. The committee also
criticized the proposed rule for limiting campaign expenditures
too drastically.
In response to these criticisms, the FEC transmitted a revised
regulation on office accounts. 20 7 Under this rule, expenditures
during the last two years of an incumbent Senator's term and the
last year of an incumbent Representative's term were rebuttably
presumed to be campaign-related, while a reverse presumption
applied to earlier spending. The committee, however, did not
think that these provisions removed the inequity between state
and federal incumbents. Moreover, since the statute did not explicitly authorize limits on office funds, the committee felt that
the FEC "may have exceeded" its statutory authority.0 " Thus,
while claiming that a rule drafted to treat every officeholder
rejecequally would be acceptable, the committee recommended
200
tion of the proposed rule, and the Senate complied.
Commission." 2 U.S.C. § 4 38(d) (Supp. V '975). See generally 121 CONG. REc.
Hioi88 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas).
203 Swillinger-Shillitoe interview, supra note I98. The justification for the
rule which was transmitted to Congress cited 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a) (Supp. V 1975),
which authorized the Commission to order reports to be made by any person.
204
H.R. Doc. No. 94-314, 94 th Cong., ist Sess. i (i975).
205 4o Fed. Reg. 32952 (75);
12 CONG. REC. S14944 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2975);
12 CONG. RFc. H8o46 (daily ed. July 31, 1975).
206 S. ERP. No. 94-4o9, 9 4 th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1975).
207 Id. The FEC explained that the changes were based upon testimony (including that of a Senator) at hearings which it had held after transmitting the
proposed rule pursuant to congressional request. Id. at 12-12.
201 Id. at 3. Although § 439(a) of the Act requires that money received to
help defray activities of a federal officeholder must be disclosed, it is silent on
limits.
209 S. Res. 275, 94 th Cong., ist Sess. (975).
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Not content with a veto of the regulations, the committee
expressed reluctance to reject a considered proposal without
furnishing some guidelines for redrafting. Its report included
recommendations, cast in language suitable for embodiment in
a rule, for provisions to "equalize" the impact of the rules.21 0 In
this way, the committee hoped to use the legislative veto to amend
agency rules indirectly without legislation. Another Senate committee had employed the same tactic in attempting to modify the
GSA's public access rules, with only limited success."
After the veto, the FEC submitted a revised version of the
regulation,2 12 explaining that it reflected the Senate report, the
Senate debate,21 3 and subsequent public comments. The rule
conformed to the Senate's wishes in extending coverage to all
federal officeholders 214 and to state officeholders on their becoming
candidates for federal office. But it retained limits on expenditures from a federal incumbent's office account in the last year of
a term, thus testing the Senate's willingness to allow any limits
at all.2 15 To support its interpretation of the statute as including
funds contributed to an office account within the definition of
political contributions subject to limitation, the agency cited the
tax treatment of those funds as contributions and the legislative
history of the tax statutes involved. To support its judgments on
policy, particularly that concerning the one-year accounting
period for federal incumbents, the FEC relied on its public proceedings, including the testimony of two Senators.
The issue was temporarily rendered moot when the Buckley
decision eviscerated the statute. Congress responded with statutory amendments to reconstitute the Commission,2" 6 and the
10

' S. REP. No. 94-io9, 9 4 th Cong., ist Sess. 3-4 (1975).

See p. 1399 supra.
H.R. Doc. No. 94-313, 94th Cong., ist Sess. x, 4 (1975).
213 121 CONG. REC. Sx787 3 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975).
214 The President and Vice President, Senators, Representatives, and Delegates
211

212

and Resident Commissioners to Congress were embraced by this term. H.R. Doc.
No. 94-313, 9 4 th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1975).
1' The Senate committee report had been ambiguous on the point.

See
S. REP. No. 94-409, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (i975).
216 Act of May 1i,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 9o Stat. 475 (to be codified in
scattered sections in 2, 26 U.S.C.). The amendments contained provisions to
expedite disposition of veto resolutions. Id. § iio(b) (i) (amending 2 U.S.C.
§ 438(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975)). They also attempted to resolve the issue of item
vetoes by defining the term "rule" as "a provision or series of interrelated pro-

visions stating a single separable rule of law." Id. § iio(b) (2) (amending 2 U.S.C.
§ 438(c) (Supp. V 1975)). The conference report explained that the provision
was not meant to give Congress the power to rewrite proposed regulations
"by disapproving a particular word, phrase, or sentence," but only to give each
house the power to determine which provisions were distinct enough to be
disapproved. H.R. REP. No. 94-Io57, 94 th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (i976). In
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agency proposed a new set of regulations.217 Sobered by its previous experience, it engaged in extensive public procedures before
issuing final regulations and submitting them to Congress. Among
these procedures were wide informal dissemination of the proposed rules, informational hearings in various regions of the
nation, and four days of formal -public hearings producing a 400page transcript.118 In addition, members of the FEC staff met

with staff of the House and Senate committees concerned with
the rules, and adopted some of the changes suggested by the congressional staff.2 19

Despite the FEC's careful preparation, or perhaps because of
it, the proposed regulations were again negated by Congress.
This time, however, there was no open vote on a veto resolution
in one of the houses of Congress, but a legislative version of the
"pocket veto." 220 When the Ninety-Fourth Congress adjourned
sine die on October 1, 1976, the FEC's rules had lain before it for

only twenty-eight of the required thirty legislative days. Congress had rejected requests by the Commission that it remain in
session for two more days so that the rules could take effect before
the 1976 elections; 2 2' thus the rules were left in limbo. The Commission issued a statement, however, warning that it would treat
the lapsed rules as interpretive rules for enforcement purposes
and would expect compliance with them during the x976 elections.2 2
Two lessons can be learned from this history of frustration
in statutory implementation.2 28 First, Congress can employ all
conference, Chairman Hays of the Committee on House Administration had
complained that the agency was trying to combine a series of unrelated matters,
so that Congress would have to accept all or nothing. Conference Transcript,
April 8, 1976, at 87-89. The amendment does not speak, however, to the practice
of explicit suggestions for agency amendments to rules which would make these
rules acceptable to Congress.
21714 Fed. Reg. 21571, 21591 (z976).
These included a further revision of
the office accounts rule in minor particulars.
218 See Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1227, slip op. at u-x8 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1976)
("Stipulation as to Findings of Fact"), certification of questions dismissed, 45
U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 2i, i977) (en banc), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v.
Kimmitt, 45 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 6, 1977).
219 Clark v. Valeo, slip op. at 15-17. One of the requested changes accepted
by the FEC concerned a change in filing practices for office account receipts.
20
See Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1227, slip op. at 2 n.2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1977)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting), digested at 45 U.S.L.W. 2349 (x977), aff'd nem.
sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 45 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 6, 1977).
2I Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1976, § A, at i, col. i; Letter from FEC Chairman Thomson and Vice Chairman Harris to Speaker of the House Albert (Sept.
29, 1976).
222 Statement of the Federal Election Commission (Oct. 5, 1976).
22' Because of the intervention of the Buckley decision, Congress and the
FEC are not solely chargeable with the delays in implementing the z974 statute.
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the provisions of a legislative veto, including the time limit for
its exercise, to influence or delay the implementation of a statute.
And in doing so, Congress may be able to avoid taking the political responsibility for its actions. Once an "independent" agency
is created, it is the natural focus for public criticism. To the
extent that committee suggestions on the content of acceptable
rules or legislative vetoes of proposed rules receive less publicity
than the passage of the implementing statute, Congress can hide
behind the structure it has created. In the case of the "pocket
veto," Congress can achieve its political objectives merely by inaction, as it did in evading a vote on the FEC's final office accounts rule.
The second lesson is that public comment at the agency level,
even combined with the pressures of interest groups on Congress,
may not be sufficient to overcome congressional self-interest. In
presenting its first office accounts rule to Congress before the
Buckley decision, the FEC had been confident that pressure on
Congress would force acceptance of the rule.2 24 This confidence
was misplaced, since sufficient pressure did not materialize. The
FEC's later attempt to build a strong record of public comment
for its post-Buckley set of rules was unavailing because Congress found a way to work its will indirectly. This history thus
demonstrates that, where procedures of low public visibility operate parallel to procedures for open public participation, the
former can be used to subvert the latter.
III. AN APPRAIsAL OF THE EXPERIENCE TO DATE
A. The Negotiation Process
Although the administrative programs in the case histories
were quite different, they had certain common characteristics.
Each was in an area of considerable public concern, if not controversy. In all the programs except that administered by the
GSA, there was repeated major legislation during the period
under study. Congress could have used such legislation to resolve
issues that had emerged in rulemaking programs subject to legislative vetoes.225 Whether for reasons of indecision or deadlock,
But still further delays impended as this history closed. Although the Commission
planned to resubmit its rules after the convening of the 95th Congress, it concluded that it could not count the 28 legislative days already passed for purposes
of the resubmission. Letter from Daniel J. Swillinger, Asst. General Counsel,
FEC, to H. Bruff (Nov. 8, 1976).
224 Swillinger-Shillitoe interview, supra note i98.
221 Congress availed itself of this opportunity in one major instance in the
case studies. The first energy statute, the EPAA, did not provide guidance on
the important issue of the timing of decontrol, see iS U.S.C. § 753 (Supp. III
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however, it ordinarily chose to leave these issues open in the
revised statutes 226 and to rely on the legislative veto mechanism
to maintain control over agency policy initiatives. Therefore,
the process of review was an active one, not one marked by congressional inattention to forthcoming rules.
Given such conditions, it is not surprising that the veto power
gave rise to negotiation and compromise over the substance of
rules between the agencies and the congressional oversight committees. Significant negotiation occurred in all five programs despite their disparate natures, and it was often intense.227 Since
the statutes generally created new programs requiring broad
implementing regulations, the initial focus of the negotiations
was correspondingly broad. As the negotiations progressed, however, the issues in controversy were reduced to a small number
for ultimate consideration by Congress. This narrowing process
gave the committees and especially their staff substantial power
to define the issues that would be likely to receive the attention
of Congress as a whole.
Since the agencies demonstrated varying abilities to resist
congressional demands for changes in the substance of rules, it
cannot be said that the committee staffs dictated changes to the
agencies. On two occassions, committees did try to amend agency
rules indirectly through the suggestion of acceptable language
in their reports. 228 The agencies did not accept these suggestions
entirely, however, even at the cost of repeated vetoes.22 Although
Congress sometimes reserved the right to make item vetoes, 2 0 it
did not attempt to use them to delete words or clauses from a
regulation and leave it in effect despite agency objections.23 ' When

x973), and vetoes resulted. The EPCA of 1975 provided a schedule. x5 U.S.C.
§ 757 (Supp. V 1975).
.. For example, HEW's broad title IX delegation was not clarified by the
amendments adding legislative veto authority. See p. 1389 supra.
...The FEA seems to have had the least negotiation; the reduced role of the
committee in the review of its rules, due partly to the short review period, led
it to lobby Congress directly. For the most intense negotiations, see pp. 1383-84,
1386 supra (OE); pp. 1398-99 supra (GSA). See also p. 1389 supra (title IX); pp.
1391, 1393 & note io9 supra (FEA); p. 1408 supra (FEC).
8
22 See P. X399 supra (GSA); pp. 4o6-o7 supra (FEC).
220 GSA suffered more vetoes after refusing to accede to congressional demands.
See p. 1402 supra. The FEC suffered the "pocket veto" that occurred at the
adjournment of the 94 th Congress. See pp. 1407-o8 supra.
230 See p. 1399 supra.
'3'The closest example of such an attempt was Congress' item vetoes of
GSA's public access regulations, but these would have prevented implementation
of the program were it not already stayed by judicial order. See pp. 1399t 14002 & note 185 supra.
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there was really basic disagreement between Congress and the
agency, the result was impasse.
Still, the negotiation process between the committees and the
agencies always resulted in some compromise, if not agreement.
One reason for compromise may have been doubts concerning
the constitutionality of veto provisions, which deterred Congress
from issuing ultimatums to the agencies. 32 The major determinant of the substantive effect of the veto provisions, however,
seems to have been the amount of bargaining power the particular
agency had with Congress. The fact that the strength of federal
agencies vis-a-vis Congress varies suggests that a general veto provision might have a greater substantive impact on some agencies
than on others and that this impact might depend partly on factors
extrinsic to the veto process. In the case studies, the GSA showed
the greatest resistance to congressional pressure because its position on public access to the Nixon presidential materials was more
conservative than that of Congress, so that it did not have a strong
desire to obtain acceptance of congressionally modified access
rules. And GSA was buttressed on some of the issues by pressure
from the courts to protect privacy interests.3 3 In a middle range
of bargaining power were the FEA and HEW: the FEA had the
advantages of expertise on technical rules, a reduced committee
role, and a short review period, while HEW could rely on popular
pressure to keep its grant programs functioning to moderate
congressional demands. 3 4 The FEC, having the least bargaining
power of these agencies because of strong congressional self-interest in its rules, has been unable to resist Congress with much
success.
Negotiations are also apparently affected by whether the particular agency program requires periodic or single promulgation
of rules. For example, the cyclical nature of the federal grant
process affected the Office of Education's strategy, and probably
its success in negotiating as well. Because the issues could be
temporarily compromised, to be revived the next year, the OE
could offer the committees some concessions each year, and persuade them to defer others. In contrast, where rules were to be
reviewed only once, negotiations were much more likely to fail.
When a veto did occur, it was often followed by another veto of
a modified rule that remained unacceptable to Congress. 3 5
232 See, e.g., p. 1387

& note 74 supra.

233 See pp. 4oi--02 supra.
234 See p. 1385 supra.
235 For example, Congress simply refused to accept the FEA's decontrol program until after the EPCA of I975, see pp. 1391-93 supra, and the GSA suffered
repeated vetoes on issues under negotiation since the outset of the public access
program, see pp. 1398-402 supra.
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On the basis of the overall success of the negotiations, the
case studies can be divided into two groups. All of HEW's programs and the FEA's oil decontrol program were eventually implemented, despite the controversial nature of HEW's title IX
rule and Congress' initial refusal to countenance oil decontrol.
On the other hand, the development of GSA's rules for public
access to President Nixon's records and the FEC's regulations for
office accounts has been hindered by such disagreement, obstruction, and acrimony that neither set of rules is yet in effect. Where
negotiation was successful, the statute applied to persons and
institutions outside of government - students, educational grant
recipients, and producers and consumers of oil. The unsuccessful
programs, on the other hand, attempted to regulate the internal
affairs of a branch of government in areas of heightened political
sensitivity.
The failure of the latter group of programs is not difficult
to explain. Whenever agencies attempt to regulate the internal
affairs of a branch of government, the interests evoked by the
rulemaking process may be politically irreconcilable for two
reasons. First, the self-interest of the regulated branch may be
directly in issue, and the strength of that self-interest may preclude compromise. Thus, it is not surprising that GSA refused
to propose rules which it felt would threaten the autonomy of the
executive branch. Nor is it difficult to understand Congress' refusal to accept rules which would make its members' campaigns
financially more difficult and politically more risky. Second, in
programs regulating internal governmental matters, there may not
be enough outside pressure by directly affected interest groups
to bolster the agency and break the deadlock.3 6
B. Public Participationand Interest Group Influence
A vital aspect of rulemaking is the opportunity for participation by all interested parties through notice-and-comment proceedings. The presence of a legislative veto could reduce public
participation before the agencies by shifting the focus of attention to congressional review. But in the case studies, public participation before the agencies continued unabated.237 Two reasons
for this are apparent. First, the initial formulation of rules by
the agency remains a critical stage in determining their substance.
23.

See, e.g., p. 1409 supra.

237 The sole exception was GSA, which did not provide for public participation

in its rulemaking, see p. 1399 & note 257 supra, but which did provide a limited
substitute in the form of selective consultation with those knowledgeable about
presidential papers. For HEW, there seems to have been no diminution in public
participation after the veto's application. Interview with Theodore Sky, Assistant
General Counsel for Education, HEW, in Washington, D.C. (May 19, 1976).
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Public pressure at this stage may prove dispositive if the resulting
rule does not awaken congressional interest. Second, even if Congress does stir, a record of considerable public interest and comment can buttress the agency in its negotiations with congressional
2 38
committees, counterbalancing competing lobbying pressures.
This suggests, however, that public participation before the agencies in programs subject to the veto might eventually shift its
emphasis from reasoned debate over policy to a showing of political strength meant to impress both the agency and Congress.
Although public comment remained a vital and effective part
of the rulemaking process in the case studies, there were indications that the veto machinery may have created opportunities for
circumvention of public participation. In certain subtle ways, the
presence of congressional review allowed the influence of special
interest groups in Congress to affect the substance of rules outside the comment process. When an agency knew of the influence
and was aware of the desires of the interest groups, it sometimes
attempted to avoid unfavorable review by drafting its rule to
satisfy those desires. For example, the FEA took this precaution
in attempting to appease the small refiners in its formulation of
Energy Action No. 2 .239 Even when the agency did not try to anticipate influence in the hope of less stringent review, the influence, if real, could make itself felt in negotiations with the oversight committee. For instance, pressure directed through the committees helped to force increases in the asset reserves for home
and farm equity under HEW's basic grants programs 240 and to
insure the inclusion of self-evaluation241 requirements desired by
women's organizations under title IX.
Both of the practices observed in these studies - agency
speculation on the effects of pressure on Congress and the application of actual pressure on Congress during negotiations with
the purposes of public comment. The
the agency -contravene
essence of a notice-and-comment proceeding is a public forum in
which all interested parties participate openly and on equal footing. Yet an agency's internal drafting decisions and its negotiations with congressional committees are of low visibility, 242 so
that both the existence and the effect of special influence are likely
to be off the record. The resultant secrecy violates two of the
238

Such use of public comment by the agency as a source of bargaining power

was evident during review of the title IX regulations, see pp. 1389-9o supra, and
the FEC's office account rules, see pp. 1408-0 9 supra.
239 See p. 1394 supra.
240 See pp. 1384-85 supra.
241
242

See pp. 1389-9o supra.
Recently, however, HEW has made some efforts to open up its drafting

process. See 41 Fed. Reg. 34811 (1976).
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fundamental standards for informal rulemaking: reasoned decisionmaking based on a record and the opportunity for public
participants to contest opposing presentations.24 3 Moreover,
when an agency seeks support for one of its rules from an interest group, that group may later demand a quid pro quo, such as
abandonment of another proposed rulemaking. Not only would
such a tradeoff violate the canons of open rulemaking, but it also
might escape congressional scrutiny.
In addition to destroying the openness of rulemaking, the
practices observed here violate the ideal of equal access to the
rulemaking process. Not all interested parties have the resources
both to participate in the public comment proceedings and to
lobby the committees effectively in the review process. Those
groups having greater resources or prior influence with congressional committees have an additional chance to affect agency
action not available to those without such resources or influence.2 44 To the extent that the negotiation phase of rulemaking subject to legislative veto authority is determinative, this
additional chance constitutes an important special advantage for
the few. Indeed, the dynamics of the review process may make
a negotiated rule substantially harder to change through subsequent public comment. Once time and energy have been spent
in negotiations between an agency and Congress, both the agency
and the committee2 may be reluctant to revise the rules that have
been thrashed out.

C. Time Constraints and Delay
Because the legislative veto involves the review of ongoing
agency programs rather than the promulgation of legislation, the
implementing statutes have required that review take place, if
at all, within a limited period of time. While in the case studies
an agency's promulgation of rules was ordinarily a slow process,
including both comprehensive public comment proceedings and
extended internal deliberations, consideration at the review stage
was necessarily more abbreviated. Congress had at most several
months to review rules that may have taken the agency years to
promulgate. The resulting time pressures on Congress significantly affected the quality and thoroughness of congressional re2 -46

view.

214 See pp. 1433-37 infra.

244 For examples in the case studies of such a second chance to affect a rule,
see pp. 1389-9 supra (title IX); pp. 1393, 1394 supra (FEA).
245 See p. 1385 & note 59 supra (OE) ; P. 1401 supra (GSA).
2' Even if the review period is adequate for thorough congressional scrutiny,
in practice Congress is likely to wait until the last minute to undertake formal
action on a rule, especially a controversial one. Consequently, extending the
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Often, the agency's supporting materials were too voluminous
to send to Congress; considerable selection was necessary.24 7
Hence, agency explanations and justifications amounted to position papers rather than careful explorations of policy alternatives.24 Under these circumstances, the review process was necessarily an attempt by Congress to second-guess the agency without the benefit of all the facts the agency had developed. The
capacity of Congress to exercise critical review of submissions
supporting rules varied not only according to whether the subject
was technical,2 49 but also according to the time required to obtain critical analysis. For example, PEA submissions amenable
to computer evaluation were more readily reviewable than those
dependent upon empirical investigation.
Aside from time constraints, another significant restriction
on the thoroughness of review was the heavy workload of the
members and staff of Congress. At times, work on legislation
pending before the committees entirely precluded review of potentially controversial rules.2 50 More often, the work of the review
process, much of which fell to the congressional staff, placed a
severe burden on Congress' resources. The negotiations observed
in our case studies between the staffs of the committees and the
agencies imposed a greater burden on the congressional staff than
much legislation. Moreover, there is some evidence that even with
the present sporadic application of veto authority, an increase in
staff alone would not have allowed the limited number of Congressmen to discharge their review functions effectively.2 '
As a consequence of Congress' heavy workload, even the committee members were not normally as familiar with a rule under
review as agency personnel, or as a reviewing court would be.2 2
This suggests that technical rules may not be the only ones likely
to cause substantial difficulties in congressional review. Given
the complexity characteristic of much administrative regulation,
review period does not necessarily relieve congressional haste, as events surrounding
review of HEW's title IX regulations demonstrate. See pp. 1389-go supra.
247 See, e.g., p. 1389 & note 87 supra (title IX); pp. 1394-95 supra (FEA);
p.

24o8 supra (FEC).
24 See pp. 1394-95

supra (FEA); p. 1407 supra (FEC). Indeed, one way
an agency can forestall critical review of its rules by Congress is by defining the
issues and drawing attention away from alternatives.
24 Compare p. 1384 supra (OE) with p. '395 supra (FEA).
2 0
See notes 55, 56 supra (OE).
221 Congressional staff perform much of Congress' oversight function at present, in the absence of veto provisions. 2 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra
note 35, at x7. It does not seem wise to increase existing dependence on them.
252 See, e.g., Hearings on the GSA Regulations Implementing the Presidential
Records and Materials Preservation Act Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't
Operations,94th Cong., ist Sess. 25 (I975).
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even legal issues - normally well within the expertise of Congressmen - may require substantial amounts of time and effort
to resolve. The need to commit this time and effort may in practice place complex legal issues beyond the capacity of Congress
to review. 3
While the time limits for review may test Congress' ability
to review rules carefully, the process of review itself may delay
or disrupt an agency's programs. In the case studies, the disadvantages of delay caused merely by having rules lie before
Congress varied substantially. The greatest disruption to an
agency's program occasioned by the very existence of a review
requirement was the lapse of the FEC's rules for the 1976 election, due to the adjournment of the Ninety-Fourth Congress before the review period expired. This incident illustrated how
congressional recesses or adjournments can increase delays substantially if the period for review is defined in terms of legislative rather than calendar days. For HEW, whose grant programs were subject to review periods based either on calendar
deadlines or on legislative days, delay was a pervasive problem
because the agency had to complete the rulemaking process within
both statutory deadlines and the constraints of the fiscal year.
Delay seemed to be less of a problem for the FEA, because its
rules were subject to very short review periods. There was some
delay, however, from FEA hesitation to submit a completed rule
to Congress while it awaited a politically propitious moment to
do so. This kind of delay might have important costs, but they
are likely to remain unseen.
Although shortening the review period reduces delay inherent
in the review process, a long review period may produce prolonged
uncertainty regarding a rule's fate. For example, all three vetoes
of the GSA rules occurred from five to six months after their
submission. Similar uncertainty may be produced by protracted
informal negotiations between the agency and congressional committees. When review does occur, as GSA's experience also demonstrates, there arise possibilities for indefinite interruptions in
agency programs, with no effective rules in the interim.
One means of ameliorating delay problems is suggested by
HEW's short-lived practice of submitting proposed rather than
final rules to Congress, so that the periods for notice and comment
and for congressional review would run concurrently. 2 4 HEW's
SI Lack

of time is not the only factor impairing the quality of review, how-

ever. Congress has not excelled in its function of general oversight of agency
action, see generally 2 STUDY oN FEDERAL REGuLATION, supra note 35, and it has
yet to decide exactly how it should review particular agency rules under a legislative veto provision. See pp. 1429-30 infra.
254 See p. 1388 supra (OE).
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experience revealed several disadvantages of the practice, however. To the extent that the agency changes its rule other than
to reflect congressional views, the procedure seems a waste of
time for Congress. Also, the agency's fear of renewed congressional review could deter rule changes in response to public comment. " ' On the other hand, if the agency believes that congressional approval is forthcoming, it will be tempted to conduct the
public comment proceeding merely as a formality to support rules
that it already plans to adopt. HEW's efforts to compress the review period suggest the further possibility that time pressure may
deter agencies from employing public participation in rulemaking.
Although reduction of public comment periods was usually forbidden by statute in the case studies, there is no guarantee that
agencies lacking such constraints would not curtail public comment. In any event, the presence of a review period is a deterrent
to the common agency practice of extending public comment
periods beyond statutory minimums. 56
D. Political Accountability

A primary purpose of the legislative veto is to increase the
political accountability of administrative regulation. In theory,
the veto power insures that agency rulemaking is consistent with
the intent of Congress. Experience under existing vetoes, however, reveals that political accountability is likely to be attenuated in practice. Although the veto power is meant to be exercised by one or both of the houses of Congress, floor votes of an
entire house on the merits of a veto resolution were rather infrequent. Most of the effective review occurred at the committee
or subcommittee level, often focusing on the concerns of a single
chairman or member.157 Indeed, much settlement of policy oc-

curred in behind-the-scenes negotiations between the staffs of the
255 HEW planned to resubmit rules whenever a "substantial" change occurred
after congressional review. See note 77 supra.
2'6 Congress could minimize delay problems by means of a simple procedural

device, such as a statutory provision that rules would take effect after the usual
3o-day period absent an action to trigger review by a congressional committee.
In fact, this is the British practice. See, e.g., J. GR ri Tm & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90-92 (5th ed. 1973). Such a rule could confine delay to
rules actually given some scrutiny by Congress. It would not resolve, however,
the problem of policy impasse following the exercise of a veto, as occurred with
GSA's rules.
257 Thus, a veto provision tends to increase an already considerable congressional dependence on committees both for the substance of legislation, HousE
SELECT COMm. ON COmmITTEES, REPORT ON

COMMITTEE REFORM

AMENDMENTS

OF 1974, H.R. REP. No. 93-916, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 9-12 (1974), and

for oversight, Robinson, supra note i, at 954-55.
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committees and the agencies. 25 There were even signs that committees engaging in relatively intense negotiations with an agency
tended to keep matters within committee in order to preserve their
negotiating stance, although the issues might merit floor review." 9
Under these circumstances, the power of review was really
exercised by congressional committees and their staffs, rather than
by either house as a whole. By reducing the number of issues
reaching Congress as a whole through negotiations, the committees
and their staff could thus settle policy issues in a way in which the
house as a whole might not, were it asked to decide.
Despite recent attempts in Congress to broaden the perspective and makeup of its committees,2 6 ° they inevitably are bodies
of relatively narrow composition compared to Congress as a
whole.261 Each member of a committee is responsible only to his
or 'her own constituency, and the total constituency of any one
committee is far from national in scope. Moreover, the "stacking"
of oversight committees with members favorable to an agency
or to the group it regulates is not unknown; 262 this practice can
forge agency-committee alliances which reinforce the capture of
agencies by the interest groups they purport to regulate.20 3 Whenever it does not report a veto resolution to the floor of a house,
the committee, with its narrow constituency, wields all of Congress' review power. In such a case, the ideal of The Federalist204
- national responsibility to a national constituency - is not
achieved. Furthermore, if committee negotiations receive no
national publicity, as has so far been the case, those few members
exercising the power of Congress may not be called to account
even by their own constituencies.
This committee-based review may result in the effective
amendment of statutes, whether or not those involved realize it.
For a process of negotiation, once initiated, is likely to take on a
life of its own. Thus, in the case studies a committee and an
agency seemed sometimes to find themselves drifting over time
2..

These negotiations gave the committee staffs a considerable amount of real

power to affect policy because staff members could often determine which issues
would reach the attention of members of Congress.
2.9See p. 1385 supra (OE).
26. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. $2276-316 (daily ed. Feb. 4, I977). See also
Adams, supra note 2, at 539 (1976). See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-96, supra
note 257; Committee Organizationin the House: Hearings Before the House Select
Comm. on Committees, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
2"' See H. FRIENDLY, supra note I, at 169-70; Watson, supra note 6, at 1054.
262 See 2 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 35, at io9.
263 See id.
2 4
1 THE FEDERALIST No. io (J. Madison).
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to a position having no necessary relationship to the original
statutory intent. 265
Although the ripening of informal negotiations into committee
hearings might have been expected to increase the political accountability of the review process, in fact its effects were not
striking. Hearings provided some visibility for the issues discussed, but they were not always effective in awakening the attention of members of Congress outside the oversight committee.
As reactive rather than creative measures, veto resolutions
both deserved and received less attention than legislation. Moreover, when a change wrought by a committee at the instance of
an interest group had only a diffuse impact on the public at large,
the classical logic of lobbying dictated that the change would
2 66
evoke little outcry.
One other factor affected the political accountability of the
veto process. In all the cases studied except that of the FEA,
Congressmen characterized their role as limited to reviewing the
legality of the agency's rule, that is, its conformity with statutory
purpose. Nevertheless, in all cases congressional review was primarily based on policy. The reason is not hard to divine: the
traditional and constitutional role of Congress is the formulation
and alteration of policy. Moreover, a major reason for imposition
of veto authority has been the indecision of Congress on policy
issues, and a desire to check the agency's later resolution of
them. 7 Members of Congress are unaccustomed, and the institution is ill-equipped, to make a restrained and judicious examination of a rule's subservience to statutory purpose. Yet Congress' profession, despite these institutional realities, to review
rules only for conformity with statutory intent has serious implications for the 'political accountability of the veto process.
Review on the putative basis of legality implies that Congress is
forming no new policy but is merely making sure that the conditions of the original delegation are met. The result is that veto
resolutions receive less public visibility and less attention from
members of Congress outside the oversight committees than, as
policy decisions, they deserve.
In the case studies, congressional review had either of two
...The OE's basic educational grants program, GSA's public access rules, and
the FEC's office accounts rule seem the best examples of this.
206 This was the case in the HEW basic grants program, in which the increase
in exemptions for home and farm equity and the consequent reduction in funding
for students whose families had no substantial real assets was not perceptible
enough to evoke sufficient complaint to attract the attention of Congress. See
pp. 1384-85 supra.
..7 This purpose of veto provisions is incompatible with legality review, since
a statutory standard against which to measure the agency action will be lacking.
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results. One was successful compromise between the committees
and the agency on the content of the rules, as was normally the
case with HEW. The other was the failure of negotiations and a
veto, with the likelihood of impasse for an indefinite period. In
either case, Congress did not form policy as a whole and in a
politically accountable way. Instead, either a committee formed
policy in conjunction with the agency, or one house of Congress
rejected the policy made by the agency, requiring the agency to
try again. In the former case, the negotiations were not publicized and the power of Congress was exercised by a few. In the
latter case, because veto resolutions were negative in effect and
because review was often explained as limited to the consistency
of a rule with an earlier statute, a Congressman's vote did not
seem to carry the responsibility of a vote on legislation. In both
cases, the accountability of Congress to the people fell short of the
ideal of national responsibility to a national constituency.
E. The Relationship of the Agencies and Congress in
the Absence of Veto Provisions
Most of the characteristics of the legislative veto process
found in the case studies do not typify the current relationship
between Congress and the agencies in the absence of veto authority. The principal difference is the negotiating process between
congressional committee staffs and agencies, which seldom occurs in the absence of a veto provision."" Indeed, the chief effect
of the veto power seems to be an increase in the power of congressional committees and in the practice of negotiating over the substance of rules. It is difficult to be precise here, because many of
the differences are matters of degree and the phenomena under
discussion are of low visibility. Consequently much existing information is anecdotal.26 9 Nevertheless, the case studies confirm
that the legislative veto power significantly alters the working relationship between Congress and the agencies.
In the absence of veto power, congressional committees have
occasionally paid close attention to the substance of particular
agency rules, either in their oversight capacity or during the
appropriations process. Perhaps the most vivid example is that
268 The case studies unearthed instances of negotiation

by HEW staff and

committee staff in programs without veto provisions, see pp. 1386, 1389 supra.
But all of them occurred after the OE's basic grants program, which has a veto
provision, had initiated negotiations between HEW and the committees.
269 For instance, the Chairman of the House Commerce Committee once spent
many hours with the Chairman of the FCC in "working over" the cable television
regulations before their issuance. See K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 148 (1971).
The literature on congressional oversight of the agencies does not usually refer to
such a process of negotiation. See materials cited in note 279 infra.
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of the House Commerce Committee's oversight of the regulation
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of pay television. For more than a decade, the committee succeeded in preventing the FCC from authorizing pay television.17 0

After the

FCC proposed authorizing pay television in 1957, the committee,
under heavy pressure from broadcasters and theater owners,
passed a resolution requesting delay. Through threats, letters,
resolutions, and hearings, it forestalled action until 1968 without
reporting any legislation to the House. These actions surely
affected not only the timing but also the substance of the FCC's
regulations, which ultimately authorized pay television only under
heavy restrictions. 1
In another case of close congressional oversight, the FCC used
proposed rulemaking to bargain for legislation in the well-known
deintermixture controversy, which resulted from the FCC's attempts to alleviate the congestion of television channels by assigning VHF and UHF channels to separate cities. At the cost of
abandoning its experiments on the deintermixture of these two
modes of broadcasting in certain communities, the FCC was able
to obtain long-sought legislation authorizing it to require the
makers of television sets to provide both UHF and VHF reception. 2 This case, of course, is ultimately an example of an
agency's success in dealing with Congress as a whole, and not
simply with a committee seeking to stall its programs. 3
There are other examples of committee pressure to suspend
an agency rulemaking program. For example, after the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) asserted jurisdiction to regulate the
sale of natural gas to pipeline companies, it terminated its rulemaking program despite clear Supreme Court sanction of its
authority to continue,

74

because opposition in Congress was

strong enough to pass a bill in the House.Y In another case, an
appropriations committee, which felt it had been defied for at
least a year by the FPC, directed the agency not to spend its
270
271

Robinson, supra note I, at 955 n.24.
In a rather similar situation, the FCC proposed a rule on the frequency of

broadcast commercials, but abandoned its rulemaking after the industry pressured
the House Commerce Committee, which held hostile hearings and reported a bill.
See W. CARY, PoLiTics AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 46-47 (1967).
272 G. ROBINSON & E. GELLIIORN, supra note 9, at 156-57.
273

There is some doubt, however, that this episode reflects a deliberate and

effective effort on the FCC's part to trade rulemaking for legislation, as opposed
to a fortuitous resolution. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure
Reform, i18 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 532-35 (1970).
274 See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
275 W. CARY, supra note 271, at 5o-5I.
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regulation of cooperatives until legislation
funds to establish
76

settled the issue.1

These examples bear out William Cary's observation that
agencies seldom take controversial steps in rulemaking without
some support in Congress, especially in the committees. 7 7 Yet
they have certain similarities to one another which distinguish
them from the review process characteristic of the case studies.
First, committee review in the absence of a veto provision frequently applies pressure at the instance of regulated interests
to stop an agency rulemaking program entirely. It does not engender a detailed bargaining process over the substance of rules,
since the industry pressure is directed toward not having any at
all. Also, committee attempts to stall an agency program in the
absence of the veto power usually occur when legislation that may
affect the program is under serious consideration. 2 8 Legislation
was considered less frequently in the case studies because the committees had an alternative available to resolve their disputes with
the agencies -

the veto of a rule.

These differences in practice reflect the existing structure of
congressional oversight of the agencies, 270 which does not foster
detailed negotiations over the substance of impending rules. Review of rules is not presently a systematic process but is triggered
by controversial rules.280 While a legislative veto requires routine
submission of rules to Congress for review, in its absence oversight
committee hearings occur sporadically and thus do not provide a
regular opportunity to negotiate the substance of rules with agency
personnel. 281 The appropriations process does provide a regular
opportunity for scrutiny of agency programs, but its focus is on
276 S. REP. No. 1-269, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (x964).
211 W. CARY, supra note 271, at 53.
27 In a well-known example, the FTC postponed

until the issue was settled by legislation. H.

LINDE

its proposed cigarette rule
& G. BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND

ADmiNISTRATIVE PROCESSES 915-48 (1976).
27

For discussions of existing oversight practices, see W. CARY, supra note 272;
H. FRIENDLY, supra note I, at x63-73; H. LnDnE & G. BUNN, supra note 278;
M. OGUL, CONGRESS OvERsEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976); Newman & Keaton,
Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws- Should Legislators Supervise
Administrators?, 41 CA IF. L. REV. 565 (x953).
28o See 2 SrTUY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 35, at 120-2z. There are
very frequent informal contacts between congressional members and staff and the
agencies, see id. at 65-66, 8i, which may help to identify controversial issues
warranting the members' attention. See also Clark v. Valeo, 45 U.S.L.W. 2349
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring), aff'd mem. sub nora. Clark
v. Kimmitt, 45 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 6, 1977). See generally Ribicoff,
CongressionalOversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 AD. L. REV. 415, 419-21 (1976).
281 Oversight hearings have, however, increased in frequency in recent years.
See 2 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supranote 35, at 8o-8i.
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funding, not on the details of policy.2" 2 As for intervention by
individual Congressmen on behalf of constituents, it is by definition sporadic and irregular. Finally, the review of appointments
deals with personal qualifications and broad policy and only
obliquely with proposed rules. 3 In contrast with these traditional
oversight techniques, review under a legislative veto scheme is
specifically and narrowly focused on the substance of proposed
rules. Thus the veto, unlike any of the traditional oversight techniques, permits regular and systematic examination of the substantive details of an agency's program.
Without the veto, a committee displeased with an agency rule
has two major options. It may stage an embarrassing oversight
hearing, or it may propose legislation to rectify the problem it
perceives. But any legislation it proposes must obtain passage
in both houses of Congress and approval by the President or a
veto override. Until the proposed legislation is adopted, a controversial agency rule, if issued, remains in effect. If the committee chooses to hold a hearing, the agency may resist, testing
the committee's power to obtain legislation. With the legislative
veto, committee power is greatly enhanced. If a veto resolution
is reported out of committee, it may need to pass in only one
house, and a vote by other Congressmen for it does not entail
the same responsibility as a vote for legislation affirmatively forming policy. Congressmen may be persuaded to support a committee recommendation for a veto as a low-cost endorsement of
the oversight power of Congress without fully considering the cost
to the interrupted program. Since the veto provides an easier
method for altering agency policy, it reduces the incentive of the
oversight committees to sponsor legislation. Because the veto is
negative, and because it reduces pressure on committees to report
legislation affirmatively resolving policy disputes with agencies,
it increases substantially the chance that no policy will be formed
by Congress or by the agency.
IV.

THE DESIRABILITY OF A GENERAL LEGISLATIVE
VETO FOR RULEMAKING

An initial question in evaluating the desirability of a statute
subjecting most informal rulemaking to legislative veto authority
is the extent to which our case studies provide a valid model for
analysis. At first glance, there seems to be one obvious distinguishing feature. In the case studies Congress selected a group of pro282

283

Id. at 18-43.
See generally SEN. Coa E.

ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG.,

MENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES

2D SEsS., APPOINT-

375-418 (Comm. Print 1976).
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grams for which it had special concern, and subjected them to
active review. Given the vast amount of rulemaking activity in
the federal government,28 4 it seems clear that Congress has neither
the time nor the inclination to extend active review under a general veto power to more than a few highly controversial rules.
Even a substantial increase in congressional staff to canvass forthcoming agency rules would not necessarily lead to frequent review
by Congressmen, because their number is fixed and their time is
limited. Meaningful review, whether by Congressmen or their
staff, seems likely to be episodic, because much agency rulemaking
is routine, technical, or otherwise noncontroversial.2 8
Reflection suggests, however, that a view which minimizes
the practical impact of a general veto provision is oversimplified.
It does not adequately account for the nature of rulemaking and
the nature of the agencies' present relations with other branches
of government. Under a general legislative veto provision, agencies may be inclined to abandon rulemaking in favor of other procedures less vulnerable to congressional scrutiny for the development of policy. Moreover, if in practice Congress does not exercise the veto power assiduously, the broader delegations of authority which it fosters may result, contrary to expectations, in
a net decrease in control over agency discretion. Partial duplication of the judicial function by Congress may create profound
problems for the courts in their review of both congressional action and agency rules. Finally, in its use of the veto power Congress may in practice venture beyond mere supervision to improper interference in the administrative function.
A. Effects on Agency Behavior
The agencies have been repeatedly criticized for pursuing an
ad hoc, "rudderless" course that emphasizes adjudication, rather
than moving decisively to form policy by rulemaking.28 0 Rulemaking is frequently relegated to relatively technical or noncontroversial aspects of an agency's mission precisely because the
agency does not choose to resort to it for resolution of hard policy
284 Congressional Review Hearings, supra note 4, at 143 (statement of Rep.
Levitas).
28 Proponents of general veto provisions often recognize this, and argue that

the veto is meant for egregious agency rules. E.g., id. at 142; id. at 66 (statement
of Rep. Clausen) ; id. at 178 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).
286 See generally Freedman, supra note 32, at 1054; Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 53 (1969); Robinson, supra note x, at 957,
967. The use of rulemaking does not guarantee vigorous policy formation, of
course, but it provides the opportunity for it. See Robinson, supra note 273, at
526-28.
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issues. 87 The reasons for this practice are instructive in evaluating a general veto provision.
Currently, strong incentives for agencies to avoid vigorous
policymaking inhere in the relations of the agencies to Congress.2 8
Many of the policy issues that agencies do not currently resolve
arise under broad delegations by a Congress which was unwilling
or unable to resolve the issues itself. Political pressures or uncertainties that prevented a statutory resolution of policy in Congress also hamper resolution by the politically weaker agencies. 89
A vigorous agency assertion of policy is likely to meet with countervailing pressure from interest groups lobbying congressional
committees. Consequently, agencies may resort to adjudication
- which is constitutionally protected from direct congressional
supervision - for the making of policy. 90
The case studies suggest that a general veto provision will
increase the power of interest groups to block or deflect agency
policy initiatives through pressure on congressional committees.
Such pressure would not always require the detailed and timeconsuming negotiation process that occurred in the case studies.
A committee not having the time or inclination to negotiate a
given set of rules could simply report a veto resolution, which, if
passed by the entire house, could lead to the kind of indefinite
policy impasse found repeatedly in the case studies. Alternatively, it could attempt to deter agency submission of a rule altogether. 9' Whenever an agency is not statutorily restricted to
policymaking by rule, the threat of such pressure is likely to drive
it toward greater use of adjudication. Unlike the agencies involved in the case studies, many federal agencies are free to
choose adjudication. Thus, by increasing agency reliance on
adjudication, a general legislative veto provision might have
pervasive effects on the nature of policymaking in federal agencies.
To the extent that a general veto power would increase reliance on adjudication at the expense of rulemaking, it would
have the reverse of the effect intended, for it would encourage the
agencies to act in ways that are even less amenable to congressional oversight than rulemaking is now. Other disadvantages
of excessive adjudication would also be increased, principally
delay in forming overall policy. Congress could attempt to avoid
excessive resort to adjudication by requiring the agencies to engage in rulemaking for the formulation of policy. But both Con287 See Freedman, supra note 32, at 1o54-55; Posner, supra note 286, at 6o, 71.
288 See generally W. CARY, supra note 271, at 57-59; PP. 1420-23 supra.
289 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL oF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIoN 25 (965).
290 See Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 578-79 (1972).
201

For examples of this in the case studies, see pp.

1391-92

supra (FBEA).
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gress and the courts have traditionally recognized broad discretion in the agencies to proceed by adjudication or rulemaking as
their judgment dictates.292 Any requirement to proceed exclusively by rulemaking could sensibly be imposed only after careful study of each program involved and might be overly rigid
even then.
A general legislative veto might have a particularly disturbing
effect on the independent regulatory agencies, since their freedom
from presidential supervision may make them more susceptible
to congressional control than the executive agencies dominating
the case studies. 3 They currently operate under broad delegations and have traditionally relied heavily upon adjudication.
These agencies have recently shown encouraging signs of moving
away from full adjudicative procedures toward rulemaking for
the formulation of policy. It would be unfortunate if the indirect
effects of a general veto provision were to reverse this trend. In
addition to increasing their reliance on adjudication, a general
veto provision might adversely affect the independent agencies
in two ways. First, it might produce frequent policy impasse between these agencies and Congress due to vetoes, because most
of their rules are of the kind that would be subject to review only
once, and because the congressional committees overseeing them
have demonstrated their capacity to stall rulemaking through
informal pressure.2 94 Second, the presence of a veto provision
would provide another opportunity, after public comment, for
regulated interests to obtain changes in a rule or to block passage of a rulemaking program. This opportunity would exacerbate current problems of the "capture" of the independent commissions by their regulated constituencies.
B. Effects on Congressional Delegations
of Rulemaking Authority
However ineffective the delegation doctrine has been in
limiting broad grants of legislative power, 9 5 its underlying purposes have not lost their force, and it still imposes some constraints
upon statutory delegations. Nevertheless, the courts have realized
92 NLRB

v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,

290-95

(1974).

In some

instances, Congress has required rulemaking by statute, but it has not done so
for the independent regulatory agencies. See Congressional Review Hearings, supra
note 4, at 426, 478, 48o.
293 It is, however, easy to overstate the differences between executive and
independent agencies in terms of actual freedom from presidential control. See
Robinson, supra note z, at 950-52. Nevertheless, Congress may pay special attention to the independent agencies. Id. at 954-55.
294 See pp. 1420-22 supra.
.9 See pp. 1372-73 supra.
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that the requirement for policy standards in legislation can be
overemphasized at the expense of other means of confining administrative discretion.296 Unwilling to require Congress to decide complex policy questions in advance under the delegation
doctrine, the courts have emphasized various means of assuring
that agency action is authorized and that agency procedures are
accurate and fair. This is illustrated by Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,2 97 which upheld a grant of authority to the President to establish wage and price controls, even though the statute
established no clear standard for the level or timing of their imposition. The court derived adequate limits on the President's
discretion from several sources. From the historical context and
other wage-price control statutes it was able to divine a congressional purpose of fair and equitable stabilization sufficient to
guide the President. Further, it noted statutory limits on the
President's power to single out an industry for special treatment
and the limited time for which controls could be applied. Finally,
the court incorporated the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act and expanded the scope of judicial review. As Judge
Leventhal emphasized in Meat Cutters, the delegation doctrine
should be viewed as a requirement that Congress impose controls
2 98
of any appropriate sort on the exercise of delegated power.
Since legislative vetoes are designed to provide controls on agency
power delegated by Congress, this approach suggests strongly
that Congress has not only the right but a constitutional duty
to oversee the exercise of its delegated powers through some
technique such as the veto.
Further consideration, however, suggests that in practice
the legislative veto may fail to define more exactly the limits of
agency discretion. Existing veto provisions, particularly those in
the energy statutes, often accompany broader grants of power than
Congress would have made without having the veto power as a
check upon their exercise. And Congress has forgone subsequent
opportunities for legislative resolution of issues emerging in rulemaking programs subject to veto, preferring instead to react to
the agency's policy initiatives.2 99 These facts, coupled with Congress' frequent difficulty in resolving policy by statute, indicate
that a general veto provision might encourage Congress to make
broader delegations than it would otherwise. If this occurs, the
veto will produce a net increase in congressional control of the
agencies only to the extent that there actually is close review
2'0 See generally G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, supra note 9, at i02-06.
207 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. ig7i) (three-judge court) (Leventhal, J.).
2

-1Id. at

209

746-47.
See pp. 1409-10 supra.
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pursuant to it. Yet under a veto statute broadly applicable to
rulemaking, limits on time and resources would make it impossible
for Congress to exercise continuing, close review, even with a
massive increase in staff. It therefore seems likely that only a
few rules would receive the careful scrutiny necessary to fulfill
the assumptions underlying broad original grants of power.
Thus, this proposed technique for increasing congressional
controls on delegated powers may actually result in decreasing
those controls in practice. As Meat Cutters emphasized, constraints on the agencies in statutes may be quite diverse, but they
should work together, and not against one another, to satisfy
the ultimate goals of the delegation doctrine.30 0 Offered as a
means of implementing the requirements of the delegation doctrine, legislative veto schemes might ultimately be viewed as
violating it.
Whatever the requirements of the delegation doctrine, the
legislative veto may be ill-suited as an aid to the final resolution
of policy for several reasons. First, it is negative in its impact.
Unlike legislation, it does not promulgate a new rule, but merely
leaves a void. Second, under a one-house veto, irreconcilable
disagreement between the houses of Congress may prevent the
formulation of any effective policy by the agency. Finally, as
experience shows, some controversies between the agencies and
Congress are long-standing, leaving a policy vacuum without any
strong impetus toward a final resolution. Indeed, the legislative
veto may contribute to a vicious circle now present in regulatory
policymaking. Congress, beset by conflicting political pressures
or uncertain of the best approach to a new problem, makes a broad
delegation to an agency without resolving policy. The agency,
subject to the same pressures or uncertainties, then proceeds to
deal with issues in an ad hoc fashion, emphasizing adjudication,
without forming any clear policy. This failure of the agency to resolve the original issues leaves Congress with nothing concrete to
consider, thereby disadvantaging it in later attempts to meet the
policymaking responsibility it did not discharge in the original
delegation. 301 To the extent that the legislative veto encourages
Congress to make broad delegations in the first instance with
the hope of resolving policy upon executive initiative, there is
a danger that it will exacerbate current problems30°
Supp. at 748.
supra note i, at 163-72; Freedman, supra note 32, at 1o54-55;
Wright, supra note 290, at 585-86.
302 Even if a rule undergoes full congressional review and escapes a veto, this
300 337 F.

301 H. FRIENDLY,

may not indicate a determination by Congress that it is optimum policy, but only
that it is not unacceptable enough to be vetoed.
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C. Effects on Judicial Review
The federal courts have yet to confront the question of
how to review an agency's rules when they are subject to a legislative veto.3 03 The question is a complex one, involving the
relationships between the three branches of government and in
some cases the "fourth branch"-the independent regulatory
agencies-in all their permutations. To what extent should
courts defer to congressional judgments on the legality of a rule,
especially if they seem mixed with policy considerations? Although congressional review is often ostensibly based on legality,
consideration of policy in a legislative body is inevitable . 4 To
what extent should courts intervene if congressional review is
explicitly based on policy? These are delicate questions freighted
with separation of powers concerns.
It is fundamental that the courts, not Congress, have the ultimate responsibility to interpret the law.30 5 To the extent that
congressional review of rules duplicates the function of the courts,
it does not seem a wise use of congressional time. Moreover, Congress is ill-equipped, both by inclination and competence, to determine its own former intent with the care and restraint customary in judicial review. The members of Congress have less
time and no better resources (briefs, memoranda of law) than
the federal courts. One might suggest that Congress has better
access to "real" legislative history than the courts or the agencies.
But the subjective intent of committee members not recorded in
publicly available committee hearings or reports and not reflected
in floor debates seems better characterized as views on policy
than as evidence of the intent of 'Congress. It is not a part of
the formal legislative history that can legitimately be read into
the statutory language as having been accepted by Congress as a
whole. For this reason, when Congress is unclear initially in
forming legislative history, it is unlikely to contribute more than
the agencies or the courts in later attempts to reconstruct it.
Furthermore, the validity of a legislative purpose that is pur303 Clark v. Valeo, 45 U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C.

Cir. Jan.

21,

1977)

(en banc),

aff'd mern. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 45 U.S.L.W. 3789 (U.S. June 6, i977), did
not reach the issue; nor has the GSA litigation, see note 170 supra.
3o4 An example of policy review masquerading as legality review occurred in
hearings on GSA's public access rules. The question of the appropriate role for
the Administrator was argued as a matter of the legality of subdelegation within
the agency. See p. 1399 supra. GSA's legal argument against the validity of
a subdelegation sought by the committees seemed weak enough to suggest that
it was a cover for a power struggle. On the other side, congressional focus on
archivists' expertise on questions of public access may have been a ruse for
distrust of the Administrator.
3'0 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137 (28o3).
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portedly part of the law but not reflected in ordinary sources of
legislative history diminishes 30as6 time passes and a new Congress
with new members convenes.

The more appropriate role for congressional review is policy
review, because it is a natural part of the legislative process that
is not engaged in by the courts. Even policy review, however,
may not have the characteristics claimed for it in veto proposals.
The level of congressional interest in a rule will depend on its political sensitivity, not the persuasiveness of the agency's justifications for it or even its consistency with other regulatory programs. This means that the process is not necessarily a coherent
one. Although the same inattention to coherent and reasoned
formulation of policy may be present in the legislative process, it
is likely to be more pervasive in the context of oversight. This is
true because oversight has had a lower priority in Congress than
legislation and Congress has traditionally been weak in its exercise. 0 7 Yet despite its shortcomings in the context of the legislative veto, policy review is clearly more appropriate than legality
review for purposes of congressional oversight.
Hence, if Congress treads on judicial ground by declaring a
rule ultra vires in a resolution, it seems appropriate for a court
to disagree. That would restore the rule's effectiveness, subject to
an authorized veto on policy grounds or to statutory change. On
the other hand, if Congress voids a rule on policy grounds, the
wisdom of its judgment should ordinarily be beyond judicial review.
Occasionally, the statute governing congressional review requires not only that a veto be for ultra vires action, but
that Congress make findings. 08 This latter requirement is not
likely to prove enforceable in court. Consider the extent to
which the findings should have to be adequate explanations in
the typical administrative law sense.30 9 For example, the required
findings in the veto resolution for HEW's title IX regulation
would be considered unacceptably conclusory if they came from
an agency. 310 Yet it would be difficult for a court to ask for
more detailed explanation without making an extraordinary intrusion on the legislative process. Thus, a court's reluctance to
direct Congress to speak coherently in giving reasons for a veto
would arise from sensitivities that have led to the demise of the
standards requirement of the delegation doctrine.31 This sug3 6

o See CongressionalReview Hearings, supra note 4, at 376.
See, e.g., Ribicoff, supra note 280.
..8 See p. 1386 supra.
.0.See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMiNisTRATIV LAw §§ 140-142 0976).
310 For a reprint of the findings, see Title IX Hearings,supra note 74.
30'

"'1 See pp. 1372-73 supra.
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gests that when a veto occurs, the comparative persuasiveness of
Congress' findings with those of the agency will not be reviewed.
If Congress does not veto an administrative rule, a court
can review its legality in the normal way. But what inference
is it to make if the rule has received attention but no veto from
Congress? Some statutes provide that the failure of Congress
to veto a rule shall not be construed as ratification; such provisions
must be considered.3 12 Certainly rules that receive little or no attention from Congress should not be viewed as ratified by it.313
However, when a floor vote is held in both houses and the rule
survives, it could be argued that Congress has ratified the rule.
Nevertheless, if congressional review is based on legality, the
courts should retain a duty to determine that question. Even
on policy review, Congress' failure to veto a rule does not necessarily mean there has been attention to legality, or that Congress
should be viewed as an authority regarding that determination.
Thus, judicial review would be appropriate in either case. If the
veto process has not reached the stage of producing committee
reports or findings by one or both houses of Congress, there is
no basis on which a court can identify even an implied judgment
by Congress as a whole. In the end, the irony of a ratification doctrine is that it would give legitimacy to -precisely those rules raising the greatest congressional displeasure short of veto. This too
suggests its inappropriateness.
Congress may impose statutory limits on judicial review of
rules subject to veto. For instance, the FEA's legislation contains
a provision forbidding judicial invalidation of its rules for arbi14
trariness or for the absence of sufficient factual foundation.
This provision was designed to make the substance of rules a
matter for internal resolution between the Executive and Congress. 313 Broad use of similar provisions limiting judicial review
could insulate great numbers of rules from scrutiny by the judiciary without subjecting them to close scrutiny in Congress as a
substitute. If increased accountability of administrative rules
is the goal of veto provisions, restricting judicial review without
ensuring congressional review is a backward step.
Recent developments affording closer judicial review of agency
312

E.g., note 64 supra.

"I But see note 38 supra. If ratification is thought possible, the most common

and effective form of congressional review, committee action, might receive some
weight.
14 See note 118 supra.
315 While ordinarily the courts defer to rational congressional judgments on
policy, such deference assumes that Congress has actually made a judgment.
When a rule has received less attention in Congress than a floor vote in both
houses, no determination by Congress as a whole has occurred.
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action, in rulemaking as well as other areas, 316 are fundamentally
inconsistent with the likely consequences in practice of a general
legislative veto. We argued above that the courts should not regard congressional action short of a veto as the ratification of a
rule. Perhaps, therefore, the courts will review rules not vetoed
in the usual fashion. But to the extent that the presence of the
veto causes the agencies to draft rules to meet political considerations unrelated to public procedures, as occurred frequently
in the case studies, review by the courts will be made more difficult. Courts will be less sure that an agency rule is what it purports to be if unknown considerations may be the ground of
decision. Courts have not prospered in their searches for motivation underlying official action; situations encouraging or necessitating that search are to be avoided.1 17 Perhaps legislative veto
procedures could be altered to protect the courts' capacity to
review agency rules.318 Existing procedures, however, do not
seem to suffice.
One obvious but important practical effect of the combination
of congressional and judicial review is the increased potential for
impasse. As a separate branch of government, the courts have
a duty to insure that agencies adhere to constitutional and statutory norms and that the actions of Congress remain within constitutional bounds. In the process of fulfilling this duty, the
courts may create obstacles to policy accommodation between
Congress and the agencies. For example, the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 10 which invalidated the composition of the FEC on constitutional grounds, caused much of the
prior accommodation between the FEC and Congress to be
wasted. 2 ° Such obstacles are not created solely by decisive constitutional rejection of the governing statute. As the GSA's
response to Nixon v. Administrator of GeneralServices 321 demonstrates, mere dicta may provoke or exacerbate conflict between
the agency and committees charged with the responsibility for
congressional review.3 22 The possibilities are endless. Repeated
remands are common in administrative law; their potential for
supra.
See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-

"6 See PP. 1375-76
3"7

tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
31'This
could be done by requiring negotiations between the agency and
Congress to be on the record or by attempting to prevent informal interaction
between the agency and Congress during the rulemaking process. See pp. 1437-39

infra.
319 424 U.S. I (1976).

32

o See pp. 1407-o8 supra.
4o8 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted,
45 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Nov. 29, ,976) (No. 75-I6O5).
321

322

See pp. 1400-01 supra.
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disruption of emerging political accommodations between an
agency and Congress is obvious. Finally, there is the possibility
that a court will invalidate the only rules which can survive a
congressional veto, creating a deadlock that the agency cannot
break.3 2 3 It could be argued that this potential for disruption and
wasted effort is the price of government by reasoned judgment.
Certainly delay and disruption are common features of the political and judicial processes. Yet at present the interactions between
the agencies, Congress, and the courts are primarily two-sided.
Congress delegates, the agency executes, and the courts review.
Legislative vetoes, by placing Congress and the courts in similar
roles, make possible a three-sided interaction, with heightened
potential for delay, disruption, and unforeseeable results.
D. Congressional Interference in Rulemaking
The congressional procedures required to bring a legislative
veto resolution to the floor of either house are cumbersome and
time-consuming. It is therefore in the interest of both the agency
and its congressional oversight committees to avoid resorting to
these procedures by resolving policy issues informally. As the
case studies show, informal negotiations with compromise on
both sides is characteristic of the review process under a legislative veto provision. These negotiations are a highly efficient
review technique in the sense that they resolve policy differences
between the agency and the committees relatively quickly, and
without destroying the coherence of the resulting rule as an item
veto might. Indeed, it is when negotiations fail and the formal machinery is invoked that policy impasse threatens.
Yet however efficient review by negotiation and compromise
may be, it has one critical feature: it involves congressional committees and staff deeply in the rulemaking process. In a series of
decisions, the federal courts have subjected similar ex parte influences in agency decisionmaking to increasing scrutiny.324 The
principles and reasoning of these decisions do not readily permit
an exemption for congressional interference. The case law is still
sparse, but developments indicate that judicial scrutiny once
reserved for adjudication and informal executive actions may be
extended to rulemaking.
Pillsbury Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 3 5 is the leading
case on judicial scrutiny of congressional interference in adjudi"23 This possibility is noted in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
4o8 F. Supp. at 338 n.,7.
114 The underlying premises of these decisions are essentially those described at
PP. 1375-78 supra.
325 3 5 4 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
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cation. In open hearings, Congressmen importuned Commissioners and agency counsel to accept a certain interpretation of an
antitrust law. Because the hearings focused on a case pending
before the agency, the reviewing court felt that congressional influence was improper: "[W]hen . . . [a congressional] investiga-

tion focuses directly and substantially upon the mental decisional
processes of a Commission in a case which is pending before it,
Congress is no longer intervening in the agency's legislative function, but rather in its judicial function." 326 The court feared
that adjudicative proceedings held under overt and heavy congressional pressure might not be impartial. 27
Until recently, any attempt to extend the reasoning of Pillsbury to the quasi-legislative rulemaking functions of an agency
would have encountered a nearly insuperable barrier. For legislative processes have traditionally been immune from the type
of due process scrutiny to which adjudication is subject. 2 8 Courts
and commentators have lately begun to recognize, however, that a
strict theoretical dichotomy between legislative and adjudicative
functions is untenable.3 29 The line between the two categories is
indistinct: there are many agency actions which do not fit neatly
into either category. And the justifications for disapproval of
secret ex parte contacts in the adjudicative context -fairness,
openness, reasoned decisionmaking based on a record, and ease
and accuracy of judicial review - are now seen to apply in rulemaking proceedings as well.
Two decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit well illustrate the imprecision of the strict dichotomy between adjudicative and legislative functions in administrative proceedings. One
of these is D.C. Federationof Civic Associations v. Volpe (Three
326

Id. at 964 (emphasis in original).
be understood, however, in light of the earlier doctrine that
a commissioner's general, abstract views on legal issues -even if those views are
strongly held or have been probed at a congressional hearing -do not constitute
prejudice for which he should be disqualified. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S. 683 (1948) (despite general preconceptions expressed at congressional hearing, commissioners remained qualified to decide whether particular respondent had
engaged in prohibited conduct as long as their minds were open on that issue).
8 See Nathanson, supra note 25, at 724-27.
3217Pillsbury must

2' See id.; Friendly, supra note 26, at 13o9-xo.

The Supreme Court, however,

citing the classic cases for the distinction, Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 44I (I915), and Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (i9o8),

has suggested that the due process clause remains unavailable in rulemaking:
While the line dividing them may not always be a bright one, these decisions represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards,
on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in
particular cases on the other.
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973).
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Sisters Bridge), 3 ° which involved informal executive action. A
Congressman had threatened to block appropriations for Washington's new subway system until the Secretary of Transportation
approved the construction of Three Sisters Bridge across the
Potomac River. Because the -Congressman's pressure had introduced a factor not authorized by statute into the Secretary's
decision, the reviewing court invalidated his approval. The court
noted that, if the Secretary's action had been "purely legislative,"
it might have been allowed to stand despite a finding that "extraneous pressures" had been considered.33 ' The action was not
purely legislative, however, because Congress had already established the boundaries of the Secretary's discretion. Thus, the
action "fell between [the] two conceptual extremes" and should
have been based only on factors which Congress had intended to
make relevant -a principle the court thought "elementary and
beyond dispute." 332
A second case in which strict categorization of administrative
actions was disapproved was Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v.
United States.333 An order of the Federal Communications Commission changing the allocation of VHF and UHF television channels was set aside because of secret ex parte contacts and minor
favors granted Commissioners by interested parties. The Commission insisted that the order had been based on a rulemaking
proceeding and that therefore the ex parte contacts should be ignored. The court responded that "whatever the proceeding may
be called," if it involves "the resolution of conflicting private
claims to a valuable privilege . . . basic fairness requires [that

it] be carried on in the open." "I The court implied that it could
scrutinize undisclosed ex parte contacts on constitutional grounds
proceeding resemble
where the interests at stake in a rulemaking
33 5
those normally dealt with in adjudication.

The trend toward careful scrutiny of influences surrounding
nonadjudicative actions that began in Sangamon and Three Sisters Bridge has been continued and elaborated by the same court
in the recent case of Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.336 In that
case the FCC's rules for pay television were set aside, in part
because members of the FCC had been party to repeated off-theF.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.
Id. at 1247.

230459
131

1971),

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030

(1972).

3321d.

a3 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
334 Id. at 224.

"' The precise basis of the court's decision in Sangamzon is uncertain because
of its alternative holding that the ex parte contacts violated the agency's own
rules. Id. at 224-25.
3 No. 75-I28O (D.C. Cir. March 25, 1977), petition for cert. filed, 4g U.S.L.W.
3808 (U.S. June 4,

1977)

(No. 76-,724).
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record contacts by both private interests and Congressmen." 7
The FCC admitted that ex parte activity was often present in its
rulemaking proceedings. Although the agency attempted to allocate time for oral argument fairly among competing interests,
arguments often continued ex parte, with compromise positions
and the "real facts" reserved for the private sessions. 38 The
court disapproved these off-the-record sessions on several grounds.
First, it noted that if actual positions were not revealed in public
comment but only in private discussions, the public procedures
required by statute and the agency's own rules would be reduced
to a sham. Second, the court observed that a complete administrative record is necessary for a reviewing court to test an agency's
decision for arbitrariness or inconsistency with statutory authority. Since such tests are impossible when the agency's record
does not contain "relevant information that has been presented
to it," the agency is not entitled to the usual presumption that its
action is proper. 339 Third, the inability of opposing parties to
respond to secret presentations deprives the agency of the benefit
of the "adversarial discussion" which is a primary purpose of
statutory notice-and-comment procedures. s40 Finally, the court
observed that secrecy in communications with the agency is inconsistent with "fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due
process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the
merits which undergirds all of our administrative law."

341

Thus,

although a constitutional ground was not necessary for the decision, the court asserted that one was available. 42
Nowhere in its opinion did the Home Box Office court attempt
to distinguish between the ex parte contacts made by private
interests and those made by Congressmen. Even in prescribing
ground rules for future presentations to the agency, the court
made no exception for members of Congress. 43 It would have

"I

There had been a series of meetings between the Commissioners and private
interests, from which the public intervenors had been conspicuously absent. See
slip op. at 87-88. In addition, broadcasters had approached "key members of
Congress," who had pressured the FCC to maintain its restrictions on pay television's access to movies. Id. at 85 n.iog, 86 n.iX2. Against a background of
longstanding congressional pressure on behalf of broadcasting interests to restrict
pay television, see Robinson, supra note i, at 955 n.24; pp. 1420-21 supra, the
Congressmen made it known in "no uncertain terms" that they opposed important
policymaking by the FCC without congressional guidance. Home Box Office, Inc.
v. FCC, No. 75-1280, slip op. at 86 n.1i2 (D.C. Cir. March 25, 1977).
s Id. at 88 n.i, (quoting FCC Mimeo No. 21343, at 4 (April 30, 2970)).
3ss Slip op. at go-gi.
34 0
Id. at 91-92.
341 Id. at 94.
342 But see note 329 supra.
343 As a prospective remedy, the court ordered that once a notice of proposed
rulemaking issues, agency members involved in the decision must refuse to engage
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been hard pressed to justify such an exception, for its opinion
was based on the fact that the substance of unrecorded ex parte
contacts is unavailable to both opposing parties and the reviewing
court - and this is true regardless of the source of the contacts
or the status of the parties making them. Moreover, both Pillsbury and Three Sisters Bridge make clear that Congressmen have
no special license to interfere with agency decisionmaking. Thus,
both the principles and the reasoning of Home Box Office seem to
apply to ex parte contacts by members and subunits of Congress
whenever those contacts are off the record.
Read together, these cases suggest growing judicial disapproval of informal congressional pressure on an agency during
rulemaking. There is no reason why this disapproval should not
extend to off-the-record negotiations between Congress and an
agency over the substance of a proposed rule. Since most of the
decisions condemning congressional interference rest primarily
on statutory grounds, -Congress might be able to remove the objections by making congressional displeasure a relevant and
authorized ground for an agency's decision. Indeed, statutes implementing legislative vetoes could authorize negotiation expressly. This, however, may only succeed in forcing courts to
explicitly constitutional grounds in order to disapprove improper
influence in the administrative decisionmaking process. In any
case, the statutory basis for disapproval of informal contacts ease of judicial review, fairness to interested parties, and reasoned
decisionmaking based exclusively on a record - is solidly
grounded in policy. These policies, relied on by the court in
Home Box Office, are central to the scheme of administrative law
developed over decades. Even if Congress has the constitutional
power, it should think twice before undermining them in order to
implement a legislative veto.
E. Modifications and an Alternative
Traditional devices for congressional oversight of agency action have not furnished a means for systematic review of agency
rulemaking. The legislative veto is designed to fill that need,
and the case studies reveal that it has significant impact on agency
rules, at least for programs in which Congress has an active interest. The case studies also reveal, however, serious problems
in current practice under the veto procedure, principally in its
fairness to interested parties, its consistency with effective judiin private discussions until a final rule is promulgated. Should an ex parte contact
occur, the document or a summary of an oral presentation must be placed in the
public file for comment. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280, slip op. at
97-98 (D.C. Cir. March 25, 1977).
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cial review, its furtherance of broad political accountability, and
its overall impact on effective policymaking in Congress and the
agencies. Despite lingering theoretical doubts that due process
applies to rulemaking, the courts are likely to insist that any negotiations be carried on in the open, and they should do so.
Policies central to the function of rulemaking in administrative
law, which we have pointed out above, demand no less. Moreover, it seems a small intrusion on the flexibility and efficiency of
negotiations to require them to be in open session and transcribed
as part of the rulemaking record.
Secrecy, however, is not the only problem with the legislative
veto as it is currently used in practice. The congressional review
process adds a second stage to rulemaking, one in which not all
interested persons now participate, and in which not all interests
receive equal attention. Thus there is a problem of substantive
as well as procedural fairness to those affected by a rule, deriving
from the narrow political accountability implicit in a committeedominated review system. Opening the negotiations to public
scrutiny and placing them on the record might lead to broader
accountability than is present now, by attracting more attention
in Congress and increasing pressure on the committees from a
wider range of private interests. This alternative, however, would
not eliminate the effects of pressure on the committees by those
interest groups most affected by a rule and best organized typically the regulated industries. The capture of agencies by
their regulated constituency to the disadvantage of the general
public is presently reinforced by pressure on the agencies through
congressional committees having members sympathetic to that
constituency. The informal negotiation process surrounding legislative veto provisions seems likely to exacerbate this problem,
even if it is required to be open.
In essence, the problem of equal access to the agency is a
political one. It exists under the present system of administration and may inhere in the quasi-legislative nature of administrative rulemaking. Nevertheless, the special advantages which
financial resources or influence give certain private interests are
discordant with the basic theme of democratic government especially if those interests are the very ones to be regulated.
One of the fundamental principles of American political democracy is the negation of faction. Congress' broad constituency,
encompassing virtually all regional and special interest groups, is
expected to average out the demands of the various factions to
produce a fair result.
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thority allows special interests to achieve their ends by pressur3" See Watson, supra note 6, at 1032-43.
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ing administrative agencies through congressional committees,
such authority works to promote, rather than negate, faction.
Perhaps agency-committee negotiations should be opened not
only to public scrutiny but to public participation as well. However, such a change would not remedy unequal financial ability
to participate, and the efficiency of present negotiations would
be lost as they became multilateral. Ultimately, open negotiations
in which the public participates would tend merely to duplicate
notice-and-comment proceedings. In any case, it is unlikely that
Congress would assent to such drastic changes in the ground
rules of review.
An alternative response to these problems of substantive
fairness would be to forbid negotiations between congressional
committees and the agencies, while retaining veto authority. To
keep a proper distance from the executive resolution of delegated
policymaking, Congress could abjure bargaining over the substance of proposed rules, awaiting their arrival in final form. It
would then rely on formal veto resolutions to void rules objectionable to either house as a whole. Since negotiations involve the members of Congress rather deeply in the essentially
executive function of implementing statutes,' such a restriction
would have a constitutional underpinning in the separation of
powers.345 Such an arrangement, however, could have serious disadvantages. By eliminating the chief current technique for
reaching policy accommodation, it might increase the probability
of impasse between agency and Congress. Moreover, it would
fail to reduce the veto's present disincentive to affirmative resolution of policy in Congress by legislation. Finally, it would relegate the legislative veto to the cumbersome and inefficient congressional machinery which gave rise to negotiations in the first
place.
Since the disadvantages of the legislative veto inhere in its
very nature, no combination of ameliorating techniques can eliminate them all. Congress should abandon it as a device for the
oversight of agency rulemaking. There are other means by which
Congress can exercise its oversight responsibility effectively without exceeding the proper bounds of its authority. Informal consultation between agency staff and congressional committee members or staff is certainly appropriate to inform Congress of
agency action and to initiate a dialogue on policy; the problem
is one of limits. Existing procedures allow congressional participation in rulemaking to occur in a perfectly appropriate fashion.
The notice-and-comment period preceding formulation of a final
rule provides an opportunity for any member of Congress, any
345 Id.

at 995.
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staff member, or even a committee or a house as a whole to state
its views on the legality or wisdom of a proposed agency rule.
While such presentations by Congress before an agency may seem
anomalous in light of the agency's ostensibly subordinate role,
they have occurred in the past,346 and there is no reason that they
ought not to continue. Congressional views can be made part of
the rulemaking record through the kind of written submission typical of notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by open congressional
testimony at an agency's public hearing.
Perhaps Congress should alter some agency procedures to
facilitate this kind of congressional activity. For example, new
requirements for more elaborate explanations of rules proposed
by the Federal Trade Commission may better alert congressional
staff to issues of importance to the members.347 If Congress makes

open submissions within established boundaries of fair procedures
for agency rulemaking, neither its expertise nor its political views
will be lost. It seems unlikely that an agency would fail to respond
in its reasons for a final rule to an explicit and reasoned congressional submission.348 The courts could then decide whether the
agency's resolution of the problem is within existing parameters
of agency discretion. This arrangement would have the prime
virtue of encouraging policy dialogue between Congress and the
agencies consistently with the fundamental responsibilities implicit in a scheme of separate but interdependent powers.
346 See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, supra note i, at 168 n.85.
...See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V i975). Congressional staff do not presently
monitor the Federal Register systematically for new rules. See 2 STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 35, at 66-67.
34" See, e.g., p. 1407 supra.

